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The Courts, the NAS, and the Future
of Forensic Science
Jennifer L. Mnookin†
INTRODUCTION
On a recent flight, the person next to me on the crowded
airplane began to chat with me. When I told her about what I
researched and studied, she looked at me with a big grin. “I
LOVE forensic science,” she said. “I watch CSI whenever I can.
They can do such amazing things. It’s all so high tech—and
incredibly accurate! It’s almost like magic, isn’t it?” She leaned
in a bit closer and looked at me intently. “Tell me, is it like that
in real life?”
I looked at her for a moment before answering. I felt a
bit like the older child on the playground about to reveal to her
younger friend that Santa Clause doesn’t really exist. I shook
my head. “No, I wouldn’t say that CSI’s depiction is entirely
realistic. In the real world, forensic science isn’t nearly so
glossy. It isn’t nearly so speedy. And most important, it isn’t
nearly so foolproof, either.”
“Really? That’s too bad,” she told me. She looked at me
directly for a brief moment, shook her head, and then looked
away. “Well, to tell you the truth, I think I’d rather just keep
believing in the television version.” Figuring that reality was
not going to be any match for CSI, I shrugged, and went back
to the book I was reading.
In fact, that casual exchange on an airplane captures
something quite important about the traditional forensic
sciences, which find themselves at a crossroads. For many longused types of forensic science, including fingerprint identification,
firearms identification, handwriting identification, and toolmark
†

Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. This is an expanded and revised
version of the Belfer Lecture, presented at Brooklyn Law School on April 7, 2009, in
honor of Professor Margaret Berger’s retirement. Professor Mnookin thanks Margaret
Berger, Ed Chang, Itiel Dror, Jennifer Friedman, Jay Koehler, and D. Michael Risinger
for helpful comments, conversations and suggestions. Many thanks to Forrest Havens
for his helpful research assistance.
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identification, experts’ claims about their field, the authority of
their methodologies, and their own abilities have dramatically
outstripped what has actually been established by persuasive
research and careful study. Forensic scientists have regularly
testified in court to matters that are, quite honestly, both less
proven and less certain than they are claimed to be. They have
overstated their degree of knowledge, underreported the
chances of error, and suggested greater certainty than is
warranted. More generally, many kinds of forensic science are
not entirely based on the methods and approaches that we
usually associate with validated research science. Their claims
and the limits to their claims are not closely based on or
constrained by the formal collection of data. Their empirical
assertions are not grounded in careful research that has been
subject to peer review and publication. There has been
remarkably little formal validation of their methods. And there
has been far too little study of how often forensic scientists
might make mistakes, and when or why these possible errors
are more likely to occur. Moreover, when academics attempt to
do research on these questions, they have sometimes faced
limited cooperation, or even downright resistance, from the
forensic science community, because practitioners, managers,
and laboratory directors (as well as police departments and
prosecutors), are often wary of research not under their
supervision or control.
For roughly the last decade, academic critics, and,
occasionally, forensic scientists themselves, have argued that
this state of affairs needs to change.1 If we cannot trust the
1

On forensic science in general, see Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions
and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2007)
[hereinafter Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions]; Roger Koppl, How to Improve Forensic
Science, 20 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 255 (2005); Michael J. Saks,
Merlin and Solomon: Lessons From the Law’s Formative Encounters with Forensic
Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069 (1998) [hereinafter Saks, Merlin and
Solomon]; Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Failed Forensics: How Forensic
Science Lost Its Way and How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149
(2008); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in
Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCI. 892 (Aug. 5, 2005); Michael J. Saks &
Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61
VAND. L. REV. 199 (2008) [hereinafter Saks & Koehler, Individualization Fallacy];
Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA ‘Fingerprinting’ Can Teach the Law
About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361 (1991). On fingerprint
evidence, see e.g., SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING
AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001) [hereinafter COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES]; David
A. Stoney, Fingerprint Identification: Scientific Status, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 55 (David L. Faigman et al
eds., 1997); David Stoney, Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality, in ADVANCES IN
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evidentiary inputs into our criminal justice system, we cannot
trust the outputs either. Numerous well-publicized wrongful
convictions have made the danger of error in our criminal
justice system both more obvious and more salient.2 Recent
research suggests that misleading and erroneous forensic
science has been a significant contributing factor in many of
the known wrongful convictions.3

FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 327 (Henry C. Lee & R.E. Gaensslen eds., 2001); Cristophe
Champod, Fingerprint Examination: Towards More Transparency, 7 L. PROBABILITY &
RISK 111 (2008); Simon A. Cole, Does ‘Yes’ Really Mean Yes? The Attempt to Close
Debate on the Admissibility of Fingerprint Testimony, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 449 (2005);
Simon A. Cole, Fingerprinting: The First Junk Science?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 73
(2003); Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings
from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189 (2004)
[hereinafter Cole, Grandfathering Evidence]; Simon A. Cole, The Prevalence and
Potential Causes of Wrongful Conviction by Fingerprint Evidence, 37 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 39 (2006); Lyn Haber & Ralph N. Haber, Scientific Validation of Fingerprint
Evidence Under Daubert, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 87 (2007); Jonathan J. Koehler,
Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They Are and Why They Matter, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1077 (2008) [hereinafter Koehler, Proficiency Tests]; Jennifer L.
Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13
(2001) [hereinafter Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence]; Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity
of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L.
PROBABILITY & RISK 127 (2008) [hereinafter Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting
Moderate]; David A. Stoney & John I. Thornton, A Critical Analysis of Quantitative
Fingerprint Individuality Models, 4 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1187 (1986) On handwriting
identification, see Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of
Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87
VA. L. REV. 1723 (2001) [hereinafter Mnookin, Scripting Expertise]; D. Michael
Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or A Fool’s Errand, by One of the Fools: How I Stopped
Worrying About Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and ‘Forensic Science’
in General) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43
TULSA L. REV. 447 (2007); D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and
Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA
L. REV. 21 (1996) [hereinafter Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts];
D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a
Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification ‘Expertise’,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989). On ballistics evidence, see Adina Schwartz, A Systemic
Challenge to the Reliability and Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification,
6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2005).
2
For an early account of the work of the Innocence Project, see BARRY
SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER DISPATCHES
FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); see also Brandon J. Garrett, Judging
Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008); D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An
Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. LAW &
CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007); The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last
visited Feb. 25, 2010).
3
Brandon J. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony
and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009). For analytic discussions of the role
of forensic science in wrongful convictions, see, e.g., William C. Thompson, Beyond Bad
Apples: Analyzing the Role of Forensic Science in Wrongful Convictions, 37 SW. U. L.
REV. 1027 (2008); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Excerpt from Transcript of Proceedings: Experts
and Forensic Evidence, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 1009 (2008); Jane Campbell Moriarty,
“Misconvictions,” Science, and The Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2007).
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While the danger of erroneous conviction provides both
a moral and practical perspective on why reliable and valid
forensic science is so important, ordinary expert-evidence
doctrine also mandates its validity as a prerequisite for
admissibility. In 1993, the Supreme Court, in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow, made clear that judges have a gatekeeping
responsibility with respect to expert evidence.4 In the federal
courts and in those states that have embraced Daubert, expert
evidence needs to be sufficiently reliable—meaning, more or
less, scientifically valid—in order to be legitimately admissible
in court.5 As a matter of formal evidence doctrine, then, forensic
science evidence should only be permitted if it meets Daubert’s
requirements. While Daubert envisioned the judicial
gatekeeper’s inquiry into reliability as “flexible,” and therefore
did not set up any absolute criteria for determining the validity
(and hence admissibility) of expert testimony, the majority
opinion did provide some important guidelines for trial court
judges. Specifically, Daubert invites courts to look at whether
the evidence or technique in question has been tested
adequately, whether it has a known error rate; whether it has
been subject to peer review; and whether it is generally
accepted by the relevant scientific community.6 At this point,
numerous Daubert challenges have been made to many kinds
of forensic science, from fingerprint evidence, to ballistics
analysis, to handwriting examination.7 But with a small
4

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
Justice Blackmun stated that the “inquiry” into the admissibility of expert
evidence is “a flexible one,” whose “overarching subject is the scientific validity—and
thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a
proposed submission.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95.
6
Id. Daubert’s approach was expanded upon in G.E. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 135
(1997) and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
7
For examples of courts permitting forensic science under Daubert or the
state equivalent, see United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding
that latent fingerprint identification methods satisfied the standards of reliability set
forth by Daubert); United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 574, 579-80 (3d Cir. 1998);
see also United States v. Ford, 481 F.3d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding shoeprint
analysis to satisfy the Daubert standard); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 233,
250 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1180 (D.N.M. 2009)
(finding firearm identification evidence to satisfy the Daubert standard); State v.
Foreman, 954 A.2d 135 (Conn. 2008); United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68, 79 (1st
Cir. 2006); United States v. Prime, 363 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that
handwriting analysis satisfies the Daubert standard); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d
261, 271 (4th Cir. 2003); Howard v. State, 853 So. 2d 781, 796 (Miss. 2003) (finding
that bite mark analysis satisfies the Daubert standard). For a list of Daubert
challenges to fingerprint evidence (but current only through 2005), see http://onin.com/
fp/daubert_links.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). For the argument that courts have
been less intense in their Daubert scrutiny in criminal cases than in civil, see, e.g., D.
5
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number of exceptions, courts have continued to permit these
kinds of evidence without limit.8
The truth of the matter is that for the last decade, both
judges and the forensic science community have chosen to
behave rather like my acquaintance on the airplane. They
prefer to play a kind of make-believe; they prefer to believe in
the television version.
In what follows, I aim to do three things. First, in Part I,
I will provide a brief overview of the present state of affairs
within forensic science, focusing on latent fingerprint evidence
and the concerns that have emerged regarding the adequacy of
its research basis. Second, in Part II, I will discuss a recent and
significant report issued in February 2009 by the National
Academy of Sciences regarding the needs of the forensic science
community.9 I will suggest that this report, though impressive
in many ways, gave too little attention to how the courts ought
to handle the admissibility of pattern identification evidence. I
wholeheartedly agree with this report’s assertion that it is
imperative that we create substantially more funding for
research and government oversight and regulation of forensic
science. But this alone will not be enough, nor is it likely even
to happen at all, unless courts also begin to take their
responsibilities in this area more seriously. In Part III, I will
look closely at how the courts have confronted (or, more
accurately, mostly avoided confronting) the present problems
relating to forensic science evidence in recent years. I will
describe the approaches, mechanisms and machinations by
which numerous courts have failed to treat their
responsibilities to assess the validity of forensic science
Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty
Being Left on The Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000).
8
There have been a small handful of cases that have restricted forensic
science evidence, at least to some extent; this issue will be discussed in detail infra
Part III.C. See, e.g., Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 1180; United States v. Green, 405 F.
Supp. 2d 104, 124 (D. Mass. 2005); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 73 (D.
Mass. 2002); United States v. Llera Plaza (I), 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Penn. 2002)
(overruled by Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Penn. 2002)); Maryland v. Rose,
No. K06-0545 (MD Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007). Expert evidence in handwriting
identification has been scrutinized more carefully by courts than have the other forms
of pattern identification evidence, and this scrutiny has sometimes led judges not
merely to limit but to exclude it altogether. For a thoughtful account of the current case
law in this area, see D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting Identification, in FAIGMAN,
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 1; D. Michael Risinger, Cases Involving the
Reliability of Handwriting Identification Since the Decision in Daubert, 43 TULSA L.
REV. 477 (2008) [hereinafter Risinger, Cases Involving].
9
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD (The National Academies Press 2009) [hereinafter NAS Report].
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evidence with adequate care, and I will also describe the
approaches taken by the few courts who have addressed the
issues seriously. This section also offers the first detailed
scholarly analysis of an approach taken by a handful of
thoughtful jurists with respect to forensic pattern evidence, in
which they continue to admit the evidence but only in a
weakened, limited form—specifically, they permit the expert to
describe similarities and differences between exemplars, while
excluding
the
experts’
ultimate
conclusions
about
identification. This section describes why that approach,
though superficially quite appealing, is far less conceptually
coherent than it appears, though I recognize that it may
nonetheless remain an attractive, pragmatic, stop-gap measure
for courts wrestling with these difficult issues. Finally, in Part
IV, I describe what a serious judicial examination of forensic
pattern identification evidence ought to entail, what questions
judges should focus on under Daubert v. Merrell Dow, and what
demands they should make as a prerequisite to admissibility in
court. I suggest that outright exclusion may, in some cases,
indeed be warranted, and should certainly, along with more
modest measures, be part of the available judicial toolkit.
A few brief preliminaries are needed to provide context
and background. First, it is important to recognize that these
concerns are not merely abstract or theoretical. In fact, a recent
study of wrongful convictions found that flaws with forensic
science—including interpretive errors, overstated testimony,
and inaccuracies—were present in a whopping 60% of the cases
studied.10 To be sure, many of the forensic science errors found
10

Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 3, at 19 n.62. In the case of microscopic hair
analysis, it is important to distinguish those cases in which forensic scientists engaged
in misstatement, overstatement, and unjustified assertions from those cases in which
the inherently limited sensitivity of the technique means that in retrospect, the jury
likely made an incorrect inference from the forensic evidence. Practitioners of
microscopic hair identification have never formally claimed an ability to identify an
individual from a hair; at most, a hair can be said to be “consistent” with a source,
which means only that it is a member of a class of hairs that could possibly have come
from that source, not that the hair necessarily came from that source. In this sense, it
is more like blood typing—e.g., “this blood is type A, and so is the defendant, so the
defendant is not excluded from the group of people who are possible sources for this
blood” than it is like DNA profiling or fingerprinting. In my opinion, if a microscopic
hair examiner provided only this kind of “class” evidence, including the defendant (or
other relevant person) as a possible source among other possible sources, it ought not to
be considered a forensic error, even if subsequent evidence shows the defendant not to
be the perpetrator. It is as if the (innocent) defendant, the blood sample, and the actual
perpetrator all had Type A blood—for the serologist to have testified that the
defendant’s blood type matched the crime scene was not erroneous, though to be sure,
the inference of guilt the jury drew from that fact combined with the other evidence
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in the study related to techniques that play a less significant
role as legal evidence than they once did, such as microscopic
hair examination (which now most frequently functions as an
adjunct to mitochondrial DNA testing of hairs instead of
standing alone as it used to do).11
However, to intimate that therefore these past errors
and mischaracterizations no longer matter is to miss a critical
point. While mitochondrial DNA testing can now often operate
as a check on microscopic hair analysis, the broader forensic
science ‘culture’ which made these earlier instances of error
possible remains very much intact. This forensic science
culture—a culture in which claims derived from experience are
often accepted as a substitute for data; a culture in which
interpretations are often framed in absolute terms rather than
in more limited or modest language; a culture in which
potentially biasing information is not systematically kept from
the forensic examiner; and a culture in which institutionally
cozy relationships between detectives, forensic analysts, and
prosecutors may encourage unconscious partisanship—remains
very much the norm within forensic science laboratories today.
It is, in the end, this culture that needs to change; new and
improved forensic techniques will not, by themselves, provide
an adequate solution.
Second, even though I certainly do wish to criticize the
current paltry research basis of forensic science and the courts’
response to that reality, I also want to emphasize several
important caveats. Forensic professionals are, for the most
part, just that—hard-working, dedicated, and trying their best,
often with quite inadequate funding. Though there are,
unfortunately, more than a handful of known instances of
forensic fraud, these incidents are the exception and not the

was erroneous. By contrast, when, as was all too often the case, microscopic hair
analysts claimed or intimated that the defendant was the source, or provided fictitious
frequency estimates for hair types, or claimed the hairs “matched” without making
clear that numerous other peoples’ hair in any given population would also match, this
would, in my view, certainly count as forensic error. For examples of forensic error, see
generally id. I thank Barry Scheck for useful conversations on this point that clarified
my thinking, even if we continue to disagree on some definitional points.
11
See, e.g., Cary T. Oien, Forensic Hair Comparison, Background
Information for Interpretation, 11 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. 2009, available at http://www.
fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/april2009/review/2009_04_review02.htm; SWGMAT (Scientific
Working Group on Materials Analysis), Forensic Human Hair Examination Guidelines,
7 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. 2005, available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/
april2005/standards/2005_04_standards02.htm#p11 (pointing out that microscopic hair
analysis and DNA often complement one another).
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rule.12 Most forensic scientists are both diligent and honest. My
criticisms of the field should not be heard as criticisms of all
those who pursue it. Furthermore, the lack of an adequate
research basis for the claims of the pattern identification
sciences is not the fault of practicing rank-and-file forensic
scientists themselves, most of whom have neither the training
nor the background to pursue such research effectively even if
they wanted to do so. These practitioners should—and indeed
must—become, to some extent, the subjects of research inquiry,
but they are not to be faulted for failing to become empirical
researchers themselves.
Third and finally, even though I strongly believe that
forensic science needs to be placed on a more secure research
foundation, I do not want to suggest, or to be heard to suggest,
that it is therefore of no value. In fact, with most of the forensic
sciences, my strong suspicion is that when we do finally insist
on pursuing the necessary research, we will find that many
kinds of forensic evidence presently in use turn out to be
extremely probative, and very much worth hearing in court. In
many fields, my prediction would also be that the error rate,
even with the methodologies in use at present, will turn out to
be tolerably low for a wide array of pattern identification tasks,
though I am far from confident this will turn out to be true in
all fields, or in all situations. But for now, these expectations
are mere speculation—the critical point is that it is time to
pursue research that will help us find out for sure. What we
have, at present, is no more and no less than an absence of
adequate evidence. This lack of evidence does not in and of
itself prove the inadequacy of the methods used by forensic
scientists. But we can, should, and therefore must, seek better
evidence establishing the validity of these techniques,
methodologies, and conclusions, so that we can have greater
legitimate confidence in the forensic sciences we use in court,
and thus better understand their possible limits and
weaknesses as well.
12

See generally Keith A. Findley, Innocents At Risk: Adversary Imbalance,
Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893 (2008); Jennifer
L. Mnookin, Excerpt from Transcript of Proceedings: Experts and Forensic Evidence, 47
SW. U. L. REV. 1009 (2008); Thompson, supra note 3; Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y. & L. 439 (1997); Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions, supra note 1;
Moriarty, supra note 3. For examples of forensic fraud, see, e.g., Forensic Fraud,
http://www.corpus-delicti.com/forensic_fraud.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) (detailing
many such cases).
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FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE AND THE LIMITS OF OUR
KNOWLEDGE

In what follows, I focus primarily on latent fingerprint
identification, but it is important to realize that I could tell an
extremely similar tale about a variety of other kinds of forensic
science, including firearms identification, handwriting
identification, bitemark identification, toolmark identification,
and the like. Fingerprint evidence is, in all likelihood, both
more probative and less error-prone than some other kinds of
forensic identification evidence, and it has a long and
extremely substantial courtroom use. It therefore provides an
especially good focus, for if the problems I am describing exist
within this forensic domain, they are likely to be equally or
more acute in other areas of pattern identification.
Fingerprint evidence was first used in the American
courtroom nearly a century ago in 1911, and for most of its
history it has been seen as the “gold standard” of forensic
science. In recent years, however, whatever metal out of which
this evidentiary standard was made has rather noticeably
begun to tarnish.13
The basic approach taken by latent fingerprint experts
involves what they call ACE-V. This acronym stands for
analysis, comparison, evaluation and verification.14 First, in the
analysis step, the examiner looks closely at the latent print
associated with the crime at issue, and decides whether there
is enough useful information contained in the image that it is
“of value” for further examination.15 If so, the examiner then
looks carefully at the various minutiae that he or she sees in
the image, and, depending on local practices and the apparent
difficulty of the print, typically marks up the print and
documents the minutiae she observes.16 Second, in the
comparison stage, the expert compares the latent print to a
13

For the history of fingerprint identification and its legal use, see generally
COLIN BEAVEN, FINGERPRINTS: THE ORIGINS OF CRIME DETECTION AND THE MURDER
CASE THAT LAUNCHED FORENSIC SCIENCE (2001); COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra
note 1; Simon A. Cole, Witnessing Identification: Latent Fingerprint Evidence and
Expert Knowledge, 28 SOC. STUD. SCI. 687 (1998); Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence,
supra note 1.
14
For a description of each stage, see, e.g., Michell Triplett’s Fingerprint
Dictionary, available at http://www.nwlean.net/fprints/a.htm.
15
Id.
16
See, e.g., Herman Bergman & Arie Zeelenberg, Fingerprint Matching,
Manual, in Encyclopedia of Biometrics (Anil K. Jain & Stan Z. Li., eds), at 502-04
(2009).
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particular source print, noting both observed similarities and
differences.17 Third, the analyst evaluates these similarities and
differences, and reaches one of three, and only three,
conclusions: identification, exclusion, or inconclusive.18 Note
that these are the only permissible options available to a latent
fingerprint expert—a match, a non-match, or a conclusion of “I
don’t know.” “Maybe,” “possibly,” and “probably,” are not
determinations presently permitted to fingerprint examiners
under their professional rules and norms.19 Finally, in the
verification step, if the first examiner has determined that the
prints match, a second examiner takes the prints and goes
through the same process to re-analyze them. In most
laboratories, this step is conducted by an examiner who is
informed of the original examiner’s conclusion before
undertaking his or her own analysis.20 This verifying examiner
typically recognizes both that (a) he or she is verifying a
conclusion already reached by someone else; and (b) that the
conclusion already reached is that the prints do match.
Latent fingerprint examiners regularly claim that ACEV is a version of the scientific method and assert that it offers a
reliable methodology that establishes that fingerprint evidence
is indeed a valid science.21 Many courts have agreed that ACEV passes muster under Daubert.22
17

The comparison print may have been to a known suspect, or to a nonsuspect known to have been in the relevant location. Or the latent print may be
submitted for an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) database search,
which compares the latent to a large database (depending on the particular database,
often many millions of images) and returns a set of possible prints for human
comparison. For some of the difficulties with interpretation of match thresholds in
AFIS searches, see Itiel Dror & Jennifer Mnookin, The Use of Technology in Human
Expert Domains: Challenges and Risks Arising from the Use of Automated Fingerprint
Identification Systems in Forensic Science, 10 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK (forthcoming,
2010).
18
For descriptions of these permitted conclusions, see SWGFAST (Scientific
Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology), Standard for
Conclusions, http://www.swgfast.org/Standards_for_conclusions_ver_1.0.pdf.
19
Note that at its 2009 annual meeting, the International Association of
Identification (IAI), the professional organization of fingerprint examiners, considered
eliminating the longstanding professional restriction on testifying in probabilistic
terms. However, the motion was the subject of significant contention and was tabled
for further study.
20
The FBI has begun to conduct some verifications “blind,” meaning that the
verifier does not recognize that he or she is verifying a conclusion reached by another
examiner. See Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint
Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION
706, 715 (2004).
21
See, e.g., Peter E. Peterson et al., Latent Prints: A Perspective on the State
of the Science, 11 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. 2009, available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/
fsc/current/review/2009_10_review01.htm. Numerous fingerprint examiners have
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In fact, ACE-V’s relationship to the scientific method is
tenuous at best: as a methodology, it amounts, more or less, to
having two different examiners look carefully at a set of
fingerprints. To be sure, the “scientific method” is itself a
complicated and capacious idea, not altogether easily or
adequately defined. But however we might define the critical
characteristics of the scientific method, it surely amounts to
more than simply careful, semi-structured observation. At root,
ACE-V in its current incarnation amounts to no more and no
less than a set of procedures to describe the careful comparison
of a latent print with a potential source print by an initial
examiner and a subsequent verifier. While careful observation
and the recording of one’s observations may be a necessary part
of many scientific practices, careful observation in and of itself
cannot be meaningfully said to constitute a method. Moreover,
the simple act of labeling this process of careful observation as
a methodology does not make it into one. Nor does bestowing
upon it the label “scientific” tell us, through the moniker,
anything about its likely validity or error rate.23
The basic difficulty is that ACE-V is too general in
conception and scope to provide much in the way of guidance or
constraint for those who practice it. The devil is in the details—
what constitutes analysis? How exactly does a competent
comparison take place? When are apparent similarities
misleading, and when might apparent differences be attributed
to something other than the two prints deriving from different
sources? ACE-V, as a methodology, does not help answer any of
these critical methodological questions, because its categories
are too general and insufficiently substantive.24
It is as if one were to describe the methodology for fixing
a car by the acronym DACT—Diagnose, Acquire, Conduct, and
Test. We could describe the DACT car-repair methodology as

described ACE-V as corresponding to the scientific method. See e.g., Mary Beeton,
Friction Ridge Identification Process—Proposed Scientific Methodology, THE DETAIL,
Feb. 18, 2002, available at http://www.clpex.com/Articles/TheDetail/1-99/TheDetail
28.htm.
22
See, e.g., United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2009); United States
v. Vargas, 471 F.3d 255 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261; United
States v. Sullivan, 246 F.Supp.2d 700 (E.D. Ky. 2003); Markham v. State, 984 A.2d 262
(Md. App. 2009); Burnett v. State, 815 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. App. 2004).
23
For the argument that the point ought not to be whether fingerprint
evidence is or is not scientific, but rather, how to improve it, see Itiel E. Dror, How Can
Francis Bacon Help Forensic Science? The Four Idols of Human Biases, 50
JURIMETRICS J. 93 (2009).
24
See generally Haber & Haber, supra note 1.
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follows: (1) diagnose the car’s problem, (2) acquire the
necessary parts for the repair, (3) conduct the repair, and (4)
test to verify that the repair fixed the problem. Whether or not
such a car-repair methodology actually works, or how well it
works, would depend entirely on the content given to these
very broad categories in specific instances. If in fact, someone
diagnosed the car’s problem correctly, located the appropriate
parts, and conducted the repair properly, the methodology
would work. But if the mechanic misdiagnosed the difficulty,
acquired the wrong parts, or made an error when conducting
the repair, the repair would fail, even though he or she had, in
some sense, followed the methodology. Now, in light of the
failed repair effort, a defender of ACE-V (and DACT) might
suggest that the mechanic had not in fact followed DACT
correctly, because he or she misdiagnosed the problem, made
an error in the repair, or made some other mistake in
application. The DACT defender might even argue that the
mechanic’s failure to fix the car established that she failed to
follow DACT; that following DACT necessitates doing the steps
correctly, not just endeavoring to follow them. But that
response would render DACT (or, analogously, ACE-V), in
some sense, merely tautological. The method does not describe
with any specificity how to complete its requirements correctly.
It is therefore illegitimate to argue that the method has not
been followed simply because the desired outcome did not
occur, precisely because the method itself underspecifies what
is required. DACT itself does not explain how to diagnose, or
what constitutes a sufficient repair, just as ACE-V does not
explain how to analyze or compare (beyond calling for careful
looking at a target portion of each print), or what constitutes a
sufficient evaluation.25 To be sure, ACE-V might be a useful
description of the basic steps a fingerprint examiner takes in
order to conduct his or her examination, but that does not
make it a very useful description of a methodology, much less a
so-called “scientific method.”
25

I am presently a member of an NIST/NIJ working group on Human
Factors in Latent Fingerprint Examination. As part of this working group’s efforts,
fingerprint examiners put together a process map describing the ACE-V process in
more careful detail than had ever previously occurred. While the process map is useful
in many ways, it also makes my point here clear: although the process map delineates
numerous steps, and diagrams in detail the steps necessary for conducting a
comparison, the actual interpretive content of terms like “sufficiency,” “identification,”
etc., are never actually specified, because at present, the fingerprint community does
not have shared definitions of these concepts.
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Surely, one would think, ACE-V in practice must
amount to more than I am suggesting? Latent print examiners
do have norms about what kinds of print ridge detail and
minutiae they ought to be looking at, and examiners are
trained to search both for relevant minutiae and to assess their
contextual relationship and position on a fingerprint.26 And
latent print examiners do discuss with one another, informally,
their personal notions regarding sufficiency, or the virtues and
limitations of different categories of print information.27
While individual examiners or even sometimes
laboratories may develop working rules of thumb about the
quantity of similarity required, latent fingerprint examination
as a field lacks any formalized specifications about what is
required in order to declare a match. There is no required
minimum number of points of resemblance or minimum
number of total print features, nor any required quantum of
any specific kind of ridge detail.28 Instead, examiners decide for
themselves, based on their training and experience, how much
similarity is sufficient to declare a match. Moreover, when
examiners look at a print, they may not even be focusing on the
same features. Two fingerprint analysts will often focus on
different minutiae in their examination of the same print;
indeed, sometimes the same examiner, when given the same
print at a different time, will focus on different minutiae than
26

Level 1 detail describes the major pattern of the print, whether it is, say, a
tented arch or a loop. Level 2 detail, which constitutes the main focus for comparison
and evaluation for most examiners, refers to the ridge quantities, details, and
characteristics, such as whether and where a friction ridge bifurcates, or terminates, or
develops a spur. Level 3 detail refers to sub-ridge detail, for example sweat pores that
may be visible in an image.
27
Fingerprint examiners, though, do not all agree that it is useful to divide
the field into precisely three different levels. See supra note 25. Though the terms are
often used in the United States, examiners in the UK do not typically focus on these
categories, and there are diverging opinions on how to define and how to make use of
Level 3 detail, for example. See the definitions of Level 1, 2, and 3 detail in Michelle
Triplett’s Fingerprint Dictionary, supra note 14 (available at http://www.
nwlean.net/fprints/l.htm); see generally DAVID R. ASHBAUGH, QUANTITATIVEQUALITATIVE FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AND ADVANCED
RIDGEOLOGY (1999).
28
Indeed, the IAI (International Association of Identification) resolved in
1973 that there was no scientific justification for having a specified minimum number
of points of similarity in order to declare that two prints matched. See Report of the
Standardization Committee of the International Ass’n for Identification,
IDENTIFICATION NEWS, Aug. 1, 1973, available at http://www.latent-prints.com/images/
IAI%201973%20Resolution.pdf. For further discussions of this point, see generally
Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1; Simon A. Cole, What
Counts for Identity? The Historical Origins of the Methodology of Latent Fingerprint
Identification, 12 SCI. IN CONTEXT 139 (1999) [hereinafter Cole, What Counts for
Identity?].
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he or she did the first time.29 The judgment is fundamentally a
subjective one, not based on any formalized measures of either
quantity or sufficiency.30
Additionally, latent fingerprint examiners do not
generally employ any statistical information or models in the
ordinary ACE-V process. The field presently does not have or
make use of robust statistically-based data about the frequency
of different friction ridge characteristics. Analysts do not make
regular or structured use in their comparisons of empirical
studies showing how common or how rare different fingerprint
details might be. They do not presently make use of any
statistically-validated standards to justify how many
identifying characteristics must be the same on two prints in
order to warrant a finding that they match. Nor do they employ
a probabilistic approach to determining the likelihood that a
print selected at random would have that quantum of
similarity, akin to the use of “random-match probability” in
DNA identification. Although significant strides are being
made toward developing these kinds of information, technical
obstacles still limit the ability to develop a satisfactory
statistical measure of the frequency of various ridge
characteristics.31 As of now, there simply is no well-accepted,
fully-specified statistical model that is available for latent
fingerprint examiners to employ.
The list of difficulties continues. A fundamental tenet of
latent fingerprint analysis is the “one discrepancy rule”—if
there is even one genuine discrepancy between the latent print
and a potential source print, then the two prints cannot have
come from the same source.32 This, however, invites the critical
question of how to decide what constitutes a discrepancy, as
29

Itiel E. Dror et al., Cognitive Issues in Fingerprint Analysis: Inter- and
Intra-Consistency and the Effect of a ‘Target’ Comparison (unpublished article, under
review at FORENSIC SCI. INT’L) (on file with author).
30
See generally id.; Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate,
supra note 1; Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence, supra note 1; Saks, Merlin and Solomon,
supra note 1; Cole, What Counts for Identity?, supra note 28.
31
One quite promising approach is being developed by a group of European
researchers. See, e.g., Cedric Neumann et al., Computation of Likelihood Ratios in
Fingerprint Identification for Configurations of Any Number of Minutiae, 52 J. OF
FORENSIC SCI. 54, (2007); J.S. Buckleton, C.M. Triggs & C. Champod, An Extended
Likelihood Ratio Framework for Interpreting Evidence, 46 SCI. AND JUST. 69 (2006).
While a version of software implementing this team’s approach to providing
probabilistic likelihood ratios is likely to be available soon, its adequacy and validity is
not yet fully established.
32
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON MAYFIELD (2006),
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0601/final.pdf; Triplett’s Fingerprint Dictionary, supra
note 14.
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opposed to a dissimilarity that can legitimately be explained in
some other way. The problem is that no two print impressions
are ever truly identical—every single impression from a print
is distinct from every other impression of a print, different to
some extent even from those that came from the same source.
A print image can be affected by the pressure with which it was
left, the surface on which it was made, the processes by which
it was lifted, and many other factors. The question when
comparing two prints, then, is not whether they are truly
“identical”—for they will never be truly identical—but rather,
whether they are sufficiently similar to each another to permit
the conclusion that they came from the same source. The
examiner needs to determine whether apparent differences are
true dissimilarities, or instead, merely artifacts that ought not
to be deemed meaningful. Unfortunately, latent fingerprint
examiners lack any formalized criteria for determining when a
difference between two prints is genuinely a dissimilarity, or
when it might appropriately be explained in other ways. At
root, this is again a matter of subjective judgment by the
trained examiner.
Note, however, that the fact that these judgments are
subjective does not necessarily imply that they are incorrect or
unreliable. If I were to look at many different photographs of
my sister, no two images of her would be identical. And yet, my
judgment of whether any given photograph was an image of my
sister or actually an image of someone else bearing a certain
degree of resemblance to my sister would, I would wager, have
a high probability of being correct. I would posit that my ability
to identify images containing my sister, and to avoid
misidentifying images of other people as my sister would be
quite high—notwithstanding my lack of formal criteria for
doing so. The absence of formal, validated standards for
making such identification of my sister does not mean that I
lack all relevant knowledge. My experience of many years of
seeing my sister in a great variety of contexts would indeed
likely help me with the identification tasks.
However, I also suspect that my ability to identify my
sister in photographs would be strong but not perfect. In some
images, she might be too far away, or too blurry, or someone
else might bear such a strong resemblance to her, that despite
my life-long knowledge of her from every angle, I might
nonetheless mistake the other person for my sister. Or
conversely, I might fail to recognize that some picture truly did
show an image of my sister. Of course, to determine how often I
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was right or wrong, we would also want to make sure we had a
good method by which to determine “ground truth,” whether or
not the photograph truly was of my sister.
The purpose of this analogy is to suggest three points
that apply as much to fingerprint identifications as to my
hypothetical efforts to identify my sister. First, I want to
suggest that experience can be a legitimate basis for
knowledge. Second, I want to suggest that knowledge need not
necessarily be formalized to count as legitimate or valid.
However, and this is the third point, if we wanted to find out
just how good my ability to recognize my sister in photographs
really was, we would need to depend on something that went
beyond my say-so. We would not want simply to take my word
for it when I said I was good at the task. We would not want to
take the simple fact of my extensive experience looking at my
sister as proof of my identification talents. Nor would we want
to blindly accept my opinion that particular photos actually
were or were not of my sister.
Instead of taking my say-so, my experience, and my
conclusions as proof of my accuracy, we should carefully test
my actual proficiency at the tasks. We would need to
investigate empirically just how well I did identify my sister; in
what array of circumstances I succeeded; and when and how
often the task proved beyond my capacity. Indeed, as I will
argue below, an equivalent focus on serious, careful proficiency
testing of practitioners is precisely what we ought to demand in
the realm of forensic science as well. Just as we would want
proficiency testing to verify my claimed experience-based
ability to identify my sister, so we also ought to require
significant proficiency of fingerprint examiners and other
pattern identification analysts. 33 And just as we ought not to
simply take my assertions about my conclusions’ accuracy as
proof of actual accuracy, we ought not to take fingerprint
examiners’ experience-based assertions of accuracy as proof of
accuracy either.34
33

See infra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing proficiency tests for
fingerprinting).
34
One important issue is feedback: if I do make mistakes in identifying my
sister, am I likely to know about them? Do I receive feedback on my accuracy that could
permit me to learn from my errors? If not, we should be especially skeptical of my
assertions of accuracy based on experience, for if my experience is not likely to provide
me with information about when and where I went wrong, I may not be able to learn
all that much from it. This is clearly a concern with the pattern identification sciences
as well, in which the opportunities for learning from feedback are quite limited. (The
situation may be even worse than one in which there is no feedback; the trial process
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Returning now to latent fingerprint examination, there
are two additional difficulties with the current state of
knowledge and practice. First, fingerprint experts claim to be
able to individualize—to connect a given print to a unique
source. When they declare a match, they assert that two prints
come from a common source to the exclusion of all other possible
sources in the world. This is an astonishingly strong claim.35 A
latent fingerprint examiner who individualizes is saying that
he or she can connect this print to one particular finger of one
single person, out of everyone in the world, everyone who has
ever lived or will ever live. But there is quite simply a lack of
empirical evidence establishing that they can actually do what
they claim.36 To be sure, both experience and some empirical
research does suggest that fingerprints are highly varied.37 But
even if fingerprints themselves are unique, this does not
necessarily mean that experts can make unique identifications
from partial latent prints, using their methods and expertise.
Evidence of uniqueness does not itself directly support the
experts’ claims that they are able to individualize.38
may provide erroneous or misleading feedback in the case of forensic errors, precisely
because forensic science evidence is often considered to be so strong. For example, if an
expert makes an erroneous fingerprint identification that leads to a conviction or a
guilty plea, that could be seen by the expert as confirming the correctness of the call,
when in fact the erroneous identification may have substantially produced the
conviction.)
35
Champod, supra note 1. Saks & Koehler, Individualization Fallacy, supra
note 1; Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1, at 139-40;
Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint
Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 992-93 (2005) [hereinafter Cole,
More than Zero]. See generally Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness,
Conclusions Without Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic
Identification, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 233 (2009) [hereinafter Cole, Forensics Without
Uniqueness].
36
NAS Report, supra note 9; Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting
Moderate, supra note 1; David A. Stoney, What Made Us Ever Think We Could
Individualize Using Statistics?, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. SOC’Y 197, 197 (1991); Saks &
Koehler, Individualization Fallacy, supra note 1.
37
See, e.g., an unpublished study cited and described in United States v.
Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004) as the 50k study, designed to show the
tremendous variation in fingerprints. But for a strong critique of this study, see David
H. Kaye, Questioning a Courtroom Proof of the Uniqueness of Fingerprints, 71 INT’L
STAT. REV. 521 (2003).
38
See generally Cole, Grandfathering Evidence, supra note 1; Mnookin,
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1. Think again of my sister in the
photograph, discussed supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. That every person
really is unique does not mean that every photographic image will be a sufficiently
clear depiction to permit a unique identification, or that my sister-identification talents
will be strong enough to succeed in all circumstances. Even if every person (or every
fingerprint) is indeed unique, the question is whether the image and the methods used
to analyze it are capable of discerning that degree of difference.
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Nonetheless, experts claim this ability as well as frequently
asserting 100% certainty in their own conclusions. In fact, they
are prohibited under their professional norms from making
probabilistic judgments, and are subject to possible sanction if
they do not follow this professional rule.39 They are told and
taught that they must either be absolutely certain, or reach no
conclusion at all. There are no shades of grey permitted—
notwithstanding that fundamentally, fingerprint matching
ought to be thought of as a probabilistic inquiry.40
How often do fingerprint examiners make mistakes?
Well, in court, until quite recently, experts frequently testified
that their technique had a “zero error rate.”41 Some examiners
tried to divide their analysis of error rate into two parts—the
error rate of the technique itself, and the error rate of the
humans who use it. They acknowledged that it was possible for
a human to make a mistake, though they asserted (again
without any significant published research) that errors are
exceedingly rare. They claimed that the technique, if used
properly, is perfect and error-free. Mistakes result only when
humans misapply it.42
This notion of an error rate of zero is exceedingly
unscientific. It borders on the meaningless, and is a far cry
from how scientists typically think about error rates. Nothing
is truly perfect—no human endeavor has an error rate of zero.
Moreover, the distinction between the error rate of the
technique and the error rate of the humans who use it is,
frankly, nonsensical with regard to fingerprint identification.
The human beings engaging in ACE-V are the technique. The
appropriate question is the error rate in practice, not an in-theclouds theoretical error rate that postulates perfect human
39

See generally SWGFAST Standards for Conclusion, supra note 18; supra
text accompanying note 19.
40
Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1; Cole,
More than Zero, supra note 35, at 992; Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness, supra note
35, at 235. However, there is ongoing discussion in the fingerprint community about
whether to modify or eliminate this rule. See supra text accompanying note 19; Stacey,
supra note 20, at 715.
41
The FBI’s Steven Meagher was perhaps the best known example of an
expert who regularly testified in this vein. See, e.g., Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 222-26
(discussing Meagher’s testimony); see also, e.g., United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68
(Me. 2006) (zero error rate argued in footwear identification case, drawing on latent
fingerprint for support and by analogy); Havvard, 260 F.3d 597; Llera Plaza (I), 179 F.
Supp. 2d 492.
42
See, e.g., Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 222-26 (discussing Meagher’s testimony);
Llera Plaza (I), 179 F. Supp. 2d 492; see also Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting
Moderate, supra note 1; Cole, More than Zero, supra note 35, at 1050.
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beings and then concludes that so long as these perfect human
beings make no mistakes, the error rate is zero. We could just
as easily say that in theory, eyewitness identification has an
error rate of zero because faces are in fact different—
notwithstanding the fact that in practice, eyewitness
identification errors are distressingly common.43 This claim of
an error rate of zero is an example of how the rhetoric of
forensic sciences is often shaped for courtroom use rather than
derived from valid scientific testing designed to produce the
most accurate possible information.44
If the actual error rate is not zero, then how often do
fingerprint examiners make mistakes? The truth is that we
really do not know. Although fingerprint examiners may, at
times, undergo proficiency tests, these exams have for the most
part been extremely easy, far easier than the kinds of
challenges that can be faced in actual casework.45 A fingerprint
examiner from Scotland Yard once, under oath in court,
referred to the FBI’s proficiency tests as a “joke” because of
how ridiculously easy they were.46 Furthermore, in some
laboratories, examiners take their proficiency tests in groups
rather than individually. In addition, proficiency tests are
generally not conducted blind, as part of what appears to the
examiner to be ordinary casework.47 Rather, examiners are
usually aware they are being tested, and may therefore,
consciously or unconsciously use a different degree of care than
usual.48 Thus, in their current form, proficiency tests might be a
check on gross individual incompetence, but they certainly
provide nothing more, and given that the examinations may be
done collectively and not blind, they may not even necessarily
provide that.
We do know that errors sometimes occur, though it is
impossible on the basis of what we presently know to attempt

43

See, e.g., BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN
IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (1995); ELIZABETH
LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
44
See Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1, at
137; see also Mnookin, Scripting Expertise, supra note 1, at 1727.
45
See Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1, at
135-36; Koehler, Proficiency Tests, supra note 1, at 1092; Cole, More than Zero, supra
note 35, at 1032.
46
Llera Plaza (II), 188 F. Supp. 2d 549.
47
Koehler, Proficiency Tests, supra note 1, at 1092; Mnookin, Confessions of a
Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1, at 136.
48
Koehler, Proficiency Tests, supra note 1, at 1092.
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to quantify their frequency.49 One particular fingerprint error—
perhaps the monster of all fingerprint errors, the most highprofile, embarrassing fingerprint mistake in recent history, at
least here in the United States—has contributed to shaping
and framing the discourse surrounding latent fingerprint
identification.50 This mistake was sufficiently public, serious,
and embarrassing that it led to a substantial inquiry into its
causes; more generally, it made the fingerprint community—
and the legal community—recognize that fingerprint errors
were not simply a matter of incompetence or an issue of purely
academic concern.51 I am referring, of course, to the mistaken
identification of Brandon Mayfield, an attorney from Portland,
Oregon who was held as a material witness in relation to the
2004 Madrid train bombing. The only evidentiary basis for
suspecting his involvement was an alleged fingerprint match.
Mayfield’s print had been one of the possible source prints
suggested by a computer database search using an AFIS
(Automated Fingerprint Identification System). Mayfield’s
print appeared fourth down on the computer-generated list of
suggestions—and according to the FBI, his print was a definite
match.52
Mayfield insisted that the identification had to be a
mistake. He told authorities he had never set foot in Spain, had
remained entirely in the United States during the relevant
period, and indeed, lacked a passport. But three separate
fingerprint examiners at the FBI, including two of the most
respected senior examiners in the office, all concluded that the
match was 100% certain. Even an independent, courtappointed expert confirmed the match as well.53

49

For an effort to describe the array of known errors, see Cole, More than
Zero, supra note 35.
50
The ongoing saga in the United Kingdom relating to Shirlie McKie might
offer the Mayfield case some competition.
51
This increased awareness, openness, and a certain increased willingness to
confront the limitations of the field, may indeed be the “silver lining” of the Mayfield
case. See Jennifer Mnookin, Op-Ed., The Achilles’ Heel of Fingerprints, WASH. POST,
May 29, 2004, at A27.
52
Editorial, The F.B.I. Messes Up, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004 at A22.; see
generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON MAYFIELD (2006),
http://www.justice gov/oig/special/s0601/final.pdf [hereinafter OIG REPORT].
53
Les Zaitz, Transcripts Detail Objections, Early Signs of Flaws, THE
OREGONIAN, May 26, 2004, at A1; Andrew Kramer, Fingerprint Science Not Exact,
Experts Say, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 21, 2004, available at http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/5032168; see also Steven T. Wax & Christopher J. Schatz, A Multitude of
Errors: The Brandon Mayfield Case, 28 THE CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 6; OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON MAYFIELD (2006), http://www.justice.gov/
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The Spanish authorities were less convinced, and after
several weeks, located another suspect, an Algerian named
Ouhnane Daoud, in a different database, who, they claimed,
was the actual source of the print. Eventually, the FBI
concurred. The FBI was deeply embarrassed, Mayfield was
released from custody, and eventually received compensation of
$2 million.54
What happened? I will mention just two of the most
important causes of the error. First, one portion of one of
Brandon Mayfield’s prints really does bear a striking
resemblance to one portion of one of Ouhnane Daoud’s fingers.55
There is no doubt that portions of the two prints are extremely
similar, and the resemblance between Mayfield’s finger and the
portion of the image most clearly visible on the latent recovered
from Madrid was, as it happens, particularly strong. How often
are we likely to see such a high degree of resemblance in prints
from different sources? No one really knows. The Inspector
General’s report, an independent investigation conducted in
the aftermath of the scandal, insists that this degree of
similarity is extraordinarily rare.56 Perhaps so, but the truth is
that we do not actually know how common or rare that degree
of apparent similarity may be. It is clear that the growing size
of the databases used for fingerprint analysis increase the risks
of misidentifications like this one.57 Latent fingerprint
examiners, at present, do make regular use of AFIS systems,
computerized databases to generate a set of possible matching
prints—possible “cold hits” based on a fingerprint match. But
the computer algorithms are far from perfect, and thus the
computer search process alone cannot determine whether any
of the possible prints actually match. Only the examiner, using
ACE-V to compare each AFIS suggestion to the latent print,
can make that determination. As the databases grow, so grows
the possibility of highly similar near-misses like Brandon
Mayfield’s—fingerprints so similar that they might fool even
crack fingerprint experts. 58

oig/special/s0601/final.pdf; Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra
note 1; Cole, More than Zero, supra note 35; Stacey, supra note 20.
54
Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Will Pay $2 Million to Lawyer Wrongly Jailed, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, at A18.
55
OIG REPORT, supra note 52 at 6-7.
56
Id. at 7.
57
Dror & Mnookin, supra note 17, at 55-56.
58
Id.
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In addition to the unexpected degree of similarity
between the prints from different sources, it appears that
cognitive bias also played a role in the debacle. Immigration
lawyer Mayfield was a Muslim; he had converted to Islam some
time earlier.59 He had also once represented a known terrorist
in a child custody dispute. While it appears that the FBI
investigators did not know these facts about Mayfield when
they first determined that his print matched the one found on
the detonation materials in Madrid, their subsequent
awareness of this information made them more reluctant to
reopen the issue or contemplate the possibility that they had
made an error. More generally, even apart from this contextual
information, it seems that once the first FBI examiner declared
the prints to match, the verifying examiners expected to find a
match. It is no great surprise, then, that they found precisely
what they expected to find, likely the result of a mixture of peer
pressure and expectation bias.60
This problem of biasing information goes well beyond
the Mayfield debacle. Forensic experts frequently have access
to information about a case that goes beyond whatever
information is actually necessary for their forensic testing.
They may be told by detectives or investigators about other
powerful evidence linking the suspect to the crime. They may
be told details about the suspect that bear no relation to the
pattern identification evidence itself—that he is a known gang
member, or that she has prior convictions, or that he has
confessed, or that this match is critical because it is the only
strong evidence in the case. No information of this kind bears
in any way on the actual forensic science inquiry, and risks
creating an unconscious biasing effect on the examiner. Indeed,
in most scientific fields, there is a careful and often formalized
effort to shield researchers from this kind of contextual
information.61 It’s too dangerous. We human beings have a
cognitive tendency to see what we expect to see. Think of the
way that medical researchers make use, whenever possible, of
carefully controlled studies to ensure that not even the treating
physicians know who is receiving the medication under
investigation and who may be getting the placebo. These
59
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Error, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 16, 2004, at A-1; OIG report, supra note 20.
61
D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer
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protections exist to protect physicians from unconscious bias
that might influence their interpretation of the effects of either
the medicine or the placebo. Currently, in the forensic sciences,
there are generally no such procedures to protect examiners
from extraneous information that may have an unconscious
influence on their findings.62
To be sure, some information, though potentially
biasing, may nonetheless be necessary for conducting the
forensic test. A fingerprint examiner, for example, will likely
need to know what surface a print came from, notwithstanding
that the information may provide context clues about the crime
itself. The point is not that examiners should lack all access to
non-forensic information relating to the case. Rather, to the
maximum extent practicable, they should only be given the
case-related information that is actually relevant and helpful to
their forensic inquiry. Dan Krane and others have coined the
name “sequential unmasking” as a label for this approach, in
order to emphasize that forensic analysts ought to learn only
that information that they actually need, and only when they
actually need it. All information, in other words, should be
unmasked—that is to say revealed—to the examiner in
sequence, and only when it is necessary.63 The examiner should
have access to all the information necessary to do his or her
analysis effectively—no more, and no less.
The concern about the danger and power of biasing
information is not simply theoretical. In a clever experiment,
cognitive psychologist Itiel Dror used the Mayfield case to show
the possibility of contextual bias effects on fingerprint
examiners’ interpretations. A small handful of fingerprint
examiners were each given a pair of prints, a latent print and a
potential source print, and told that they were the prints from
the Mayfield case. Each examiner was asked to evaluate
whether or not the prints matched, using only the information
contained in the print.64
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See generally id; see also, e.g., Michael J. Saks et al., Context Effects in
Forensic Science, 43 SCI. & JUST. 77 (2003).
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Dan Krane et al., Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer
Effects in Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI., letter to the editor, 1006
(2008); see also Risinger et al., supra note 62; William C. Thompson, Subjective
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64
Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to
Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L, 74, 76 (2006).

1232

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4

In fact, however, unbeknownst to the examiners, the
prints were not the Mayfield prints. Each examiner was
actually given a set of prints that he or she personally had
previously testified in court were a 100% certain, positive,
error-free individualization. But now, when provided with this
biasing contextual information suggesting that the prints were
those involved in the Mayfield scandal, 60% of the examiners
(three of the five examiners tested) reached the opposite
conclusion, determining that the two prints in front of them did
not in fact match.65 A fourth examiner judged the prints to be
inconclusive.66 Only one of the five examiners reached a
conclusion consistent with his or her original judgment that the
prints matched.67 To be sure, the Mayfield incident was a
significant scandal, so the potential biasing effect of this
context information was obviously quite extreme. Nonetheless,
given some fingerprint experts’ insistence that their
methodology is not vulnerable to unconscious bias or general
human fallibilities, Dror’s findings generated a great deal of
interest and a certain amount of both surprise and anxiety
within the fingerprint community.68 The experiment was, in a
sense, a possibility proof, showing that bias could indeed, at
least in some circumstances, be significant enough to affect
examiners’ conclusions. Follow up experiments by Dror and his
collaborators on a larger number of examiners and with less
starkly biasing information still revealed the potentially
biasing effect of contextual information on analysts’
judgments.69
From one perspective, these findings are quite
unsurprising. Research across a variety of other fields shows
that we are all potentially biased by context and expectation.70
Given that, why should we be in the least surprised that
forensic science is no different than other cognitive enterprises?
65
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The recognition that fingerprint examiners are potentially
subject to bias does not mean that they are behaving
unprofessionally, or being careless, or not trying hard enough.
Cognitive biases are an inherent danger of our cognitive
architecture.71 That forensic scientists are not immune to them
is hardly a surprise—except, perhaps, to those forensic
scientists who were committed to a conception of their
infallibility.
Dror’s studies do make absolutely clear that bias is not
simply a theoretical concern but a practical one as well.
Moreover, they reveal that at least in some circumstances,
biases may be acute enough to affect forensic examiners’
outcome judgments. These studies therefore suggest both the
theoretical and practical importance of taking concrete steps to
limit examiners’ access to biasing information. To be sure,
these studies are preliminary, and involve only a relative
handful of examiners. Nonetheless, these studies, coupled with
all that is already known about bias in other cognitive
domains, strongly suggest that this area should receive
significant further study, so that we can better understand how
and when bias poses a danger, and how often bias may be
strong enough to affect an examiners’ conclusions. There is also
a significant need to identify the mechanisms that could
usefully reduce those biasing effects that cannot be eliminated.
Furthermore, as law professor Michael Risinger has
pointed out, the limited forensic science research on biasing
effects to date ought not to be taken as an excuse for inaction.72
We know enough right now that we ought not to require
further research before taking all reasonable action to reduce
bias effects. The existing forensic-oriented studies, albeit
limited in number and preliminary, coupled with the far more
substantial research in other domains revealing human beings’
cognitive vulnerability to bias, should reverse the burden of
proof: unless the forensic science community can establish that
it does not need blinding protocols, masking procedures, or
other mechanisms that would reduce or eliminate bias, we
should assume that bias-reduction mechanisms are indeed
already warranted by our current degree of knowledge.73
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THE NATIONAL ACADEMY REPORT ON THE STATE OF
FORENSIC SCIENCE

For those who closely follow the debates in forensic
science, much of what I have described up to this point will
have been quite familiar. But for those who began reading this
Article believing in the television version, so to speak, the
significantly more complicated reality may have come as
something of a surprise. I hope I have, in this whirlwind tour,
left those of you who walked with great confidence in the
reliability of fingerprints at least a bit unsettled.
Unfortunately, for the most part, the same cannot be said for
the courts.
Beginning around a decade ago, enterprising attorneys
began bringing admissibility challenges to fingerprinting,
drawing to the courts’ attention the kinds of problems and
weaknesses I have just described. But nearly all of these
challenges failed. One lone court did actually exclude
fingerprint evidence in 2007, calling it “a subjective, untested,
unverifiable identification procedure that purports to be
infallible.”74 But although that case parroted what had
practically become conventional wisdom in certain academic
circles, as a legal decision it was a voice in the wilderness.
Every other trial judge who has considered the admissibility of
latent fingerprint identification since Daubert has found it to
meet the applicable standard for the admissibility of expert
evidence. It has been, for the most part, too hard for judges to
contemplate excluding a form of evidence that has been
routinely used for nearly a hundred years. For those academics
engaged in constructive criticism of the forensic sciences,
reading these judicial opinions has often felt like walking in a
house of mirrors. As I will describe in more detail below,
evidence of the problems facing forensic science would often be
ignored, distorted, or recast, in order to help courts avoid
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Maryland v. Rose, No. K06-0545 (Balt. County Cir. Ct. 2007), available at
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confronting the insufficient research basis supporting these
forms of evidence.75
Meanwhile, late in 2005, partly at the request of the
leadership of the forensic science community itself, Congress
commissioned the well-regarded, independent, and nonpartisan National Academy of Sciences to research and write a
report on the needs of the forensic science community. In
February of 2009, the long-anticipated report was issued.76
This report was written by an interdisciplinary panel of
distinguished scholars and practitioners, who conducted their
own investigation into the state of the research, and also heard
numerous days of testimony from a substantial number of
leading forensic science professionals, researchers, and others
knowledgeable about the state of the forensic scientists.77 This
panel included scientists from a variety of fields, several
forensic professionals, and some with legal experience.78 The
panel also included one law professor: Brooklyn Law School’s
own Margaret Berger, in whose honor this Festschrift volume
of the Law Review has been written. In essence, the 319-page
report substantially confirms the views of the academic critics
about the inadequacy of the research basis to support many of
the claims routinely made by forensic scientists.79
For example, the report finds that there is not an
adequate basis for claims of individualization. The report also
finds “a notable dearth of peer-reviewed, published studies
establishing the scientific bases and validity of many forensic
methods.”80 The report claims that research on proficiency,
performance, and the role of bias and observer effects is “sorely
needed.”81 All in all, “[t]he present situation . . . is seriously
wanting, both because of the limitations of the judicial system
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See infra Part III.
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and because of the many problems faced by the forensic science
community.”82
The report’s boldest and perhaps most important
recommendation is for the creation of a new independent
federal agency to regulate, supervise, and improve the forensic
sciences. This agency, dubbed the National Institute of
Forensic Science (NIFS), would be responsible for funding
research to improve forensic sciences; it would also be
responsible for establishing and developing best practices, and,
more generally, supporting and overseeing the forensic science
infrastructure.83 One academic has quipped that the NIFS
would be “a mixture of the SEC and the NSF” for forensic
science, rather an apt characterization.84 The report explains in
detail that no other existing agency has, in the committee’s
view, the ability effectively to provide all of what forensic
science needs in terms of both research management and
regulatory oversight.85 No existing agency—neither NIST, the
NIJ, nor anyone else—has, according to the report, the
necessary expertise, resources, and appropriate political
culture to permit it to perform this array of functions credibly
and successfully.86
The report makes a number of other significant
recommendations. It calls in strong terms for additional
research to establish the validity and reliability of forensic
sciences, as well as research to examine the extent of biases
and observer effects.87 It calls for mandatory laboratory
accreditation and mandatory individual certification of forensic
scientists (right now both are entirely optional).88 Significantly,
it calls for the use of incentive funding to motivate states to
make their crime laboratories independent from law
enforcement and prosecutors.89
The report has received a good deal of attention both
from within the forensic science community and from outsiders.
As of now, several hearings on Capitol Hill have been held to

82

Id. at 5-9.
Id. at 5-14.
84
Roger Koppl, Professor of Econ. & Fin., Farleigh Dickinson Univ., Remark
at a Forensic Science Conference at Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor
College of Law (2009).
85
NAS Report, supra note 9, at 5-24.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 5-18.
88
Id. at 5-19.
89
Id. at 5-17.
83

2010]

THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE

1237

consider its recommendations.90 President Obama has created a
forensic science task force to consider how to proceed.91 But the
unfortunate reality is that now, roughly a year after the report
was issued, almost no one believes that NIFS is going to be on
the horizon any time soon. A new federal agency seems to be
neither fiscally nor politically viable.
Overall, the NAS report is an impressive achievement,
and both its criticisms and suggestions are, in my view,
generally on the mark. However, I do have one relatively
significant quarrel with the report, which relates to its
treatment of the legal aspects of forensic science and
admissibility. The report offers a thorough and trenchant
critique of how the courts have thus far handled forensic
science. It describes how the courts have substituted long use
for an actual focus on proven validity.92 It points out the ways
in which judges have been “utterly ineffective” at honestly
assessing the research basis of the pattern identification
sciences.93 I agree completely. The report further contends that
the judiciary, particularly given judges’ lack of training in
science, the case-by-case nature of the adjudicatory system,
and the limits of appellate review, cannot be expected to solve
this problem on its own. “Judicial review, by itself, will not cure
the infirmities of the forensic science community.”94 Again, I
wholeheartedly agree.
But then, at this key point, the NAS report decides to
punt. After offering this significant critique of the judiciary’s
actions, the report is distressingly silent about what the
judiciary ought to do next. If judicial review by itself will not
and cannot solve our problems in the forensic science arena,
does it nonetheless have some role to play? While we await
NIFS, or any other significant federal initiative vis-à-vis
forensic science; while we await the necessary research that we
hope will eventually be done; while we await greater regulation
and the possibility of mandatory accreditation, what should
90
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judges do? Sit idly by, and continue permitting pattern
identification evidence as they always have? While providing a
good deal of persuasive authority to any judge who wishes to
scrutinize forensic science with more care, the NAS report does
not offer any specific guidance whatsoever for courts wrestling
with admissibility determinations under Daubert.
Understandably, the committee may have thought that
sweeping statements about admissibility were unwarranted,
and more generally that telling judges how to behave would be
overstepping its mandate. I fully recognize that the NAS report
was directed at Congress and was not primarily intended for
the courts. But the committee might have done more. For
example, while the report says there is no scientific basis for
claims of individualization, it does not go one step further and
explicitly say that such testimony ought therefore to be deemed
objectionable.95 The report says that a zero error rate is not
scientifically plausible, but it does not explicitly say that
testimony asserting such a rate should therefore be viewed
with skepticism.
To be sure, these are easy inferences to draw from what
the report does say. If Daubert says that expert evidence needs
to be established as reliable and valid, and a court accepts the
NAS report’s conclusion that a zero error rate is not
scientifically plausible, then it might be a simple matter of
syllogistic logic to conclude that any claim of a zero error rate
does not pass Daubert. And there is no doubt that the report is
already being cited by defense attorneys in the latest round of
Daubert motions that are, inevitably (and, in my view, quite
appropriately) being spurred by the report’s contents and
conclusions.
But there is, in the report, a certain sense of
resignation, perhaps even fatalism, about the courts. There is a
tone that suggests that the committee may have thought that
the judiciary has done such a poor job of gatekeeping in this
area that it is hard to imagine the possibility of change.96 To
have faith in the courts’ capacity to make an about-face in this
domain is, perhaps, the mark of a naïve optimist, or maybe
even a chump.
While I agree with the report that courts alone cannot
and will not prompt the necessary reforms to forensic science,
95
96
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it also seems to me that courts absolutely do need to be part of
the solution. For courts to continue to treat forensic science
evidence in the same manner that many of them did prior to
the NAS report would be worse than cowardly. The NAS report
strongly suggests that the concerns expressed in recent years
by a number of academic critics were neither overstated nor
illegitimate. The academic critics were not crackpots, nor were
they Chicken Littles worrying about something that no one else
could see because it wasn’t really there. There truly is an
insufficient basis in research for many of the strong claims that
forensic scientists have been making for years. The courts
should squarely confront that fact and decide in a thoughtful
way what consequences it creates for these forms of evidence;
what effects it has on admissibility; and whether it means that
the evidence should, at a minimum, be limited, and if so, how.
Admittedly, the question of whether fingerprint
evidence should pass Daubert or the equivalent test under
state law is a difficult one. Fingerprint evidence has been used
in court for roughly one hundred years. There is no doubt that
the pattern variation among human friction ridges is indeed
enormous, and that fingerprints, whether or not they are truly
unique, certainly have extremely significant discriminatory
power. Fingerprint evidence is quite obviously probative.
Moreover, people trust it. Not just “people”—not just the
proverbial man in the street, not just forensic scientists
themselves, not just prosecutors. Even those of us—like me—
who are sometimes viewed as critics of fingerprint evidence
acknowledge its probative power.97 For example, if you asked
me which piece of evidence I would have more confidence in, an
eyewitness identification by a crime victim of the perpetrator, a
stranger who was viewed for a short period of time by the
victim during a stressful crime; or a latent fingerprint
identification of an individual made from several high-quality,
clear latent prints found in a location and in circumstances
strongly suggesting that whoever left the print was connected
to the crime, my honest answer would be the fingerprint
identification. All of these facts make it extremely difficult for a
court to seriously and deeply consider the possibility of
excluding, or even limiting, this form of evidence.
97
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And yet, in a way these facts about the power of
fingerprint evidence are beside the point, or at least they do not
adequately and fully answer the question of fingerprint
evidence’s legitimate admissibility in court. The problem with
fingerprint evidence is not that it completely lacks probative
power, but rather that research on the domain has not yet
established the appropriate limits to its probative power, or
shown how that value varies depending on its quality or its
quantity of information. It is as if I wanted to sell you a
valuable jewel and the question was how much it should cost.
We may both agree that the jewel is indeed valuable, but the
right question is not whether it has value, but just how
valuable it is, and just how we can know its appropriate value.
If I refused to research that question, or even to permit any
research on the specific characteristics of the jewel that would
help assess its precise value, and I further refused to research
the relevant market information to help determine its
appropriate price, I would have an extremely hard time selling
the jewel, and legitimately so. If all I said was, “Of course it’s
valuable. We both know it’s simply the most valuable jewel in
the world. I’m not going to investigate the question of its
precise value, but we both know it’s virtually perfect. Let’s
therefore just agree that it’s worth an extraordinary amount
and price it accordingly,” we would both expect you to walk
away from the potential sale.
Fingerprint evidence, like that jewel, is obviously
valuable. But like that jewel, we should be wary of ‘buying’ it
as legal evidence in court until we have a better, researchbased understanding of precisely how valuable it is, and
whether there are instances in which we might be assuming it
to have a significantly higher value than it really does. Without
careful proficiency testing of examiners, without information
about what the significance of any given ‘match’ really is,
without error rate information about the frequency and
circumstances of mistakes, without understanding which
fingerprint identifications are easy and which ones are more
difficult and hence more likely to be error-prone, we should be
cautious buyers indeed. Quite possibly, the better strategy
might be simply to forego the purchase until more of the
necessary information is available. Still, recognizing this
somewhat awkward state of affairs—that we have a form of
evidence that obviously often has probative power, but also has
a strikingly inadequate research basis—helps, I think, to make
sense of the courts’ reluctance to exclude, or in some
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circumstances, even honestly to engage with the arguments
made by defense counsel.
III.

HOW HAVE THE COURTS ANALYZED THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF FINGERPRINTS?

In the remaining portion of this article, I will explore
both what courts have actually done when confronted with
challenges to the admissibility of pattern identification
evidence, as well as what they ought to do. First, I will focus on
what they have done, and then turn to what they ought to do,
but it may be valuable to preview my suggestions about what
they ought to do before turning to look at how courts have
actually responded to the numerous pattern identification
admissibility challenges that have arisen.
My bottom line is straightforward: Forensic science
experts should not continue to be given free rein to testify in the
manner they have typically done up until now. Judges need to
develop a variety of thoughtful approaches—a toolkit of sorts—
with which they can assess admissibility, and this toolkit
should absolutely include outright exclusion in some
circumstances. What judges ought to do may well not be the
same across the board, even within the same field—as Kumho
Tire v. Carmichael98 indicates, and as Michael Risinger has
usefully emphasized,99 the court’s responsibility when assessing
the admissibility of expert evidence is to focus on “the task at
hand”—which means looking closely at the specific nature of
the claims being made in the particular circumstance. This
means that we may not be able to achieve—nor may we
necessarily want—a one-size-fits-all admissibility approach to
any given form of pattern identification evidence. Admissibility
determinations, and the scope of permissible testimony, may
depend on the details—is it a single partial latent from AFIS,
or are there nine extremely clear latents corresponding to three
different fingers of the defendant? What is the quality of the
print or prints in question? What specific claims is the expert
trying to make, and how absolute are the conclusions
presented? These questions, and others like them, ought to
inform judges’ analyses. All pattern identifications are not
98
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created equal, and a blanket approach to admissibility, pro or
con, is not likely to be warranted.
Nonetheless, at a bare minimum, given currently
available knowledge, courts ought not to permit evidence of
either individualization or a zero error rate. Even the forensic
science community is beginning—slowly and in the case of
individualization somewhat falteringly—to recognize that these
claims are perhaps better let go.100 But I would go further. In
many cases involving pattern identification, courts have, as of
now, only two legitimate choices if they are to take Daubert
seriously: either (1) limiting the evidence by restricting it to
description of similarities and differences, rather than offering
opinions; or (2) outright exclusion. One alternative is to greatly
restrict the expert’s testimony, limiting it to description of
similarities and differences without any evidence providing an
interpretation of these similarities and differences. This option,
though superficially appealing, raises some thorny
admissibility concerns which are hard to avoid in a principled
way, as I will describe below. Nonetheless, it seems acceptable
as an imperfect, interim solution for courts who simply find it
too hard to exclude evidence that likely does have significant
probative value. The second approach, and one that deserves
far more serious consideration than most courts have been
prepared to give it, is outright exclusion.
While that may sound like an extreme reaction—cutting
off the patient’s arm when perhaps it could have been put in a
cast and saved—it is important to note, as I will argue below,
that with a modicum of effort on the part of researchers and
forthright cooperation from the forensic science community,
exclusion would be quite short-lived. As I will argue in Part IV,
100
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courts’ primary focus under Daubert should be on the question
of whether the expert’s claims have been subject to adequate
testing—whether there is evidence that supports the claim that
the expert can actually do what she says she can do. Complete
knowledge of the cognitive practices of fingerprint evidence; a
validated statistical model of ridge characteristics and
frequencies; even objective standards for determining whether
or not prints match—all of these forms of knowledge would be
valuable, beneficial, and are absolutely worth pursuing, but
they need not exist in order for latent fingerprint evidence to be
legitimately admissible under Daubert. What courts really
ought to consider requiring, in many cases, as a minimum
prerequisite to admissibility is simply much better error rate
information about examiners’ abilities in practice. And
producing this information is eminently achievable with
concerted focus and effort.
I turn, now, to what courts have actually done when
confronted with admissibility challenges to fingerprint
evidence and other kinds of pattern identification evidence. Up
to the present, courts wrestling with these admissibility
challenges have offered several categories of arguments and
made certain repeated intellectual moves. In this Part, I will
describe three dominant analytic approaches that courts have
taken: (1) the ostrich maneuver, (2) the ACE-V conclusion
(where ACE-V stands, in this case, for “Admissible—
Considering Everything, it’s Valid (enough));” and (3) the
Solomonic compromise.
A.

The Ostrich Maneuver: Problem? What Problem?

The first approach taken by some courts when
confronting challenges to the admissibility of pattern
identification evidence is what I call the ostrich maneuver,
because these courts appear to be trying desperately to keep
their heads in the sand. Certain judges have, to a sometimes
remarkable extent, averted their eyes to the quite legitimate
concerns about the research basis supporting the conclusions
offered in the pattern identification sciences. These judges have
more or less asked, “Problem? What problem?” An archetypal
example of the ostrich maneuver occurred in United States v.
Havvard.101 The judge’s view of the issue was captured early in
101

117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000). Though Havvard is an especially
dramatic “ostrich” opinion, it is certainly not the only one. See, e.g., United States v.
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his written opinion finding that fingerprinting passed Daubert,
when he wrote, “The court’s decision may strike some as
comparable to a breathless announcement that the sky is blue
and the sun rose in the east yesterday.”102
The judge went on to explain why, in his opinion, fingerprint
evidence posed virtually no genuine difficulty under Daubert.
He concluded, for example, that fingerprint evidence could be
relied upon because it had indeed been tested (testing being
one of the most important factors under Daubert) “in
adversarial proceedings with the highest possible stakes—
liberty and sometimes life.”103 Note the judge’s slippage here—
Daubert envisions scientific testing, not courtroom testing. In
fact, the entire purpose of Daubert—a heightened reliability
screen for expert evidence—derives from the idea that the
crucible of the courtroom is, by itself, an insufficient check on
validity and reliability for scientific and expert evidence. If
testing through adversarial proceedings were enough, then a
separate judicial inquiry into reliability would be entirely
superfluous.104 We wouldn’t need Daubert at all, because the
crucible of the courtroom would suffice. Notwithstanding the
Reaux, 2001 WL 883221 (E.D. La. 2001); State v. Cole, 2002 WL 1397452 (Del. Super.
2002); United States v. Rogers, 26 Fed. Appx. 171, 2001 WL 1635494 (C.A.4 (N.C.)
2001).
102
Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
103
Id. at 854.
104
To be sure, one could make the argument that we do not actually need a
special judicial check on validity and reliability for expert evidence. One could possibly
defend this claim on a variety of grounds, ranging from (1) an argument that
adversarial testing through the presentation of contrary evidence and crossexamination are in fact an adequate method for evaluating expert evidence; to (2) that
there may be little evidence that judges’ evaluation of the legitimacy of expert evidence
is epistemically superior to that of juries, in which case using them as a ‘reliability’
screen for evidence might be epistemically ineffective and, therefore, potentially
usurping the power of the jury for no legitimate purpose; to (3) that we do not engage
in strong validity checks on other kinds of potentially unreliable evidence and there is
an insufficient institutional or epistemic justification for treating expert knowledge
differently, etc. But none of these arguments—whether or not they have any
intellectual merit—provide a legitimate basis for a lower court within our legal
hierarchy to argue that ‘adversarial’ testing constitutes testing of the sort envisioned
by Daubert. A judge could make a more subtle argument that adversarial testing is
adequate for “shaky but admissible” evidence. Daubert says, and indeed the judge in
Havvard quoted, later in his opinion: “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Havvard, 117 F.
Supp. 2d at 854 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).
But while the power of adversarial testing might be an argument for permitting
borderline evidence (and indeed, is a contributing argument to the ACE-V approach to
these questions discussed below, infra notes 114-128 and accompanying text),
adversarial testing should not be understood as the kind of testing referred to and
expected by Daubert.
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sleight of hand at work in Havvard with respect to the idea of
testing, adversarial testing simply cannot legitimately be seen
as fulfilling Daubert’s idea of testing.
The judge engaged in a similar, though less egregious,
sleight of hand with respect to the peer review and publication
factors of Daubert. He granted that the “publication” factor was
an awkward fit for fingerprint evidence because it had been
developed “for forensic purposes,” but found that adversarial
testing offered an adequate substitute.105 He also found that
there was plenty of peer review, both because of the practice of
having one examiner verify the conclusions of another, and also
because any examiner could review the conclusions of any peer
by taking her own look at the prints in question.106
Is the verification stage of ACE-V akin to peer review?
It is true enough that having verification as a standard practice
does provide a certain degree of routine peer examination for
each declared fingerprint match. But peer review of, for
example, manuscripts for publication, usually, though not
always, makes the reviewers blind to authorship. More often
than not, peer reviewers do not know whose manuscripts they
are reading so that they are not potentially biased by the
authors’ credentials or experience. Moreover, peer review in the
context of research assessments permits a kind of semi-public
scrutiny and dialogue regarding the merits of the researchers’
methodology and approaches, precisely because it typically
involves scrutiny by other experts from outside the original
author’s workplace or close circle of collaborators. Having your
immediate colleagues take a look at an article is not what
journals—or Daubert—means by peer review. Moreover, peer
review usually also requires written commentary and reasoned
explanation.107
The verification phase of fingerprint evidence thus fails
to map precisely onto scientific peer review in several
important ways. To be sure, if verification were conducted as a
“blind” review, i.e., the verifying examiner did not know whose
identification she was verifying or even that she was
conducting a verification rather than an initial analysis, it
105

Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
Id.
107
On peer review, see generally Effie J. Chan, The ‘Brave New World’ of
Daubert: True Peer Review, Editorial Peer Review, and Scientific Validity, 70 NYU L.
REV. 100 (1995); Lars Noah, Scientific “Republicanism:” Expert Peer Review and The
Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033 (2000); Susan Haack, Peer
Review and Publication: Lessons for Lawyers, 36 STETSON L. REV. 819 (2007).
106

1246

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4

would be a closer, though still not exact, fit. But even blind
peer review would be more of a check on consistency—
reliability in the scientific, rather than legal sense—rather
than validity or accuracy. That two examiners reached the
same conclusion shows no more and no less than that they
reached the same conclusion. If blind verifiers consistently
reach the same conclusion as the original analyst, it shows that
the method generates consistent results, but it does not
necessarily show that it achieves accurate results, though in
some instances we may be willing to infer accuracy from
consistency.108
Clearly, then, verification cannot simply be equated
with academic peer review. However, I grant that equating
verification with peer review is not quite as distressing,
conceptually, as equating adversarial testing with scientific
testing, especially given that Daubert intended its criteria as
suggestions rather than hard requirements. These suggestions
may be appropriately modified to apply to the particular
circumstances of the practices at issue and the “task at hand”
in the specific case109 and thus a loose analogy between peer
108

Accuracy and consistency are not necessarily correlated—I could have a
miscalibrated instrument that gives me the same result every time and yet is always
wrong. It is equally possible that there could be a method that generates consistent
results even when practiced by different individuals, but these consistent results were
not accurate. Think for example, of a poorly designed psychological test for depression.
Different testgivers might use the test on patients, get consistent diagnoses, and yet be
wrong, because the test wasn’t well designed in the first place. Ironically, in the case of
latent fingerprint identification, the absence of a consistent method (given that, as
discussed above, at infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text, ACE-V is less a method
than an outline of procedural steps for careful looking) might legitimate an inference of
some degree of validity from generally consistent results through blind peer review. If
examiners have extremely consistent results notwithstanding the fact that they use an
array of imprecisely defined and not-quite-identical approaches, including choosing
different minutiae, different standards for determining the quantum of information
required to call an identification, and varied practices for conducting a comparison, we
might be prepared to think their consistent results provided some warrant for inferring
validity. It is as if instead of conducting the same psychological test multiple times, we
conducted several different psychological tests and all of them resulted in the same
diagnosis; these multiple methods’ consistent results would be cumulative, and thus
could increase our confidence in the correctness of the original diagnosis. The irony is
that this potential evidentiary power of verification results from the lack of formalized
or consistent standards; to whatever extent examiners are doing the same thing as one
another, verification can establish only consistency, or a check on methodological error,
but not validity, because the verification evidence would be merely redundant, rather
than cumulative. On cumulative and redundant evidence, see generally DAVID A.
SCHUM, THE EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC REASONING (2001). For an
analogous argument in the context of human/technology partnerships in fingerprint
evidence, see Dror & Mnookin, supra note 17, at 60-65.
109
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137, the third case in the so-called Daubert trilogy,
emphasizes the importance of focusing on the “task at hand.” For discussion of the
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review and verification might not be out of place. But given
that there is absolutely no publicly-available data about how
often peer review of the sort engaged in by fingerprint
examiners actually catches errors, or how well it functions in
operation, the courts’ easy willingness to presume its utility
seems to be overreaching. For example, if non-blind verifiers
virtually never disagree with the original analyst, than the
power of this “review” as a check may in fact be quite limited,
for it might be that whatever errors do occur are, as in the
Mayfield case, likely to be repeated by subsequent analysts as
well. 110
But while the analysis in Havvard is generally
unpersuasive, it is the opinion’s conclusion that is most ostrichlike of all. The court wrote, “In sum, despite the absence of a
single quantifiable standard for measuring the sufficiency of
any latent print for purposes of identification, the court is
satisfied that latent print identification easily satisfies the
standards of reliability in Daubert and Kumho Tire. In fact,
after going through this analysis, the court believes that latent
print identification is the very archetype of reliable expert
testimony under those standards.”111 Reasonable people can
disagree about whether fingerprint evidence ought to be
admissible under Daubert. But to argue that it is the “very
archetype of reliable expert testimony under those standards”112
strains all credibility. Only by putting one’s head in the sand
could one possibly conclude that latent fingerprint evidence—
which has been tested in the adversarial crucible but not
scientifically, lacks meaningful error rate information, and
operates without statistical foundation or any validated,
objective criteria for determining a match—is the archetype of
reliable evidence under Daubert.113
importance of this focus, see generally Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”, supra
note 99.
110
However, if verifiers disagree with the original analyst more than
occasionally, that provides indirect evidence that the error rate for an individual
examination is not, in fact, negligible.
111
Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (emphasis added).
112
Id.
113
Another ostrich maneuver, in some ways even more extreme than the
superficial and poorly-reasoned analysis in Havvard, occurs when courts decide that
pattern identification evidence is so clearly reliable that they do not even permit the
defense to hold a preliminary hearing on the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph,
2001 WL 515213, *1 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001), for one example. Of course, this issue is
complicated by the question of what the defense actually proffers. For example, if a
defense attorney asks for a hearing but has done no substantial preparation and fails
to make a credible argument, a judge would appropriately deny the request. That
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The Judiciary’s Own Version of ACE-V

The second approach is what I, slightly tongue-in-cheek,
call the judiciary’s version of ACE-V. In this case, the acronym
stands for “Admissible—Considering Everything, it’s Valid
(enough).” This category of cases includes those courts who
attempt, with at least a modicum of seriousness, to engage
Daubert and Kumho Tire’s requirements vis-à-vis pattern
identification testimony, and who recognize that the research
basis supporting the evidence is not what one would wish it to
be. Nonetheless, these courts, though squirming a bit and
acknowledging some of the legitimate concerns regarding the
research basis for this evidence, find that, on balance, the
evidence still warrants admission in its traditional form,
though without fully explaining what justifies this conclusion.
United States v. Sullivan is an illustrative example of
this approach.114 The court wrote:
The court shares the defendant’s skepticism that the ACE-V
methodology enjoys a 0% error rate, making it effectively a perfect
art. There is no evidence, however, that the ACE-V methodology as
performed by the FBI suffers from any significant error rate. The
FBI examiners have demonstrated impressive accuracy on
certification-related examinations, and Younce testified that an
examiner who made a false identification would be finished as an
examiner due to the difficulty in rehabilitating him or her as a
witness. While the defendant is correct that the party submitting the
evidence has the burden of establishing its reliability under Daubert,
the defendant has failed to submit any evidence to dispute the
plaintiff’s evidence of a minimal error rate. Consequently, while the
court rejects the plaintiff’s claim of a 0% error rate, it finds that the
appears to be what occurred, for example, in United States v. Pena, in which the trial
court reasoned, “the case law is overwhelmingly in favor of admitting fingerprint
experts under virtually any circumstance.” 586 F.3d 105, 110 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Consequently, the court reasoned, the only way it would
have considered excluding the testimony or giving a limiting instruction ‘is if there had
been data, real evidence presented about the limitations of fingerprinting.’” Id.
“Instead, as the court acknowledged, Pena’s motion to exclude relied on ‘one article
from the Fordham Law Review, and that’s not enough to carry the weight of the
exclusion motion.’” Id. It is quite understandable that a court is not going to waste its
time with a preliminary hearing when the defense is so ill-prepared. But the appellate
case law in the case suggests that it is never an abuse of discretion to admit fingerprint
evidence without a preliminary hearing, and this is a distressing—and ostrich-like—
conclusion. Id. Interestingly, just as this Article was going to press, Judge Nancy
Gertner, whose opinion refusing a Daubert hearing was affirmed in Pena, subsequently
issued a novel procedural order explicitly referencing the NAS report, to make clear her
openness to hearing well-prepared challenges to pattern identification evidence. See
Procedural Order, available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/pdf/ProcOrder
TraceEvidenceUPDATE.pdf (last visited April 17, 2010).
114
246 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
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error rate is not sufficient to render ACE-V unreliable under
Daubert.115

The court squarely recognized that a zero percent error rate is
not credible. The court further acknowledged that the
proffering party had the burden of showing reliability, which
ought to have meant that a lack of error rate information
counted against the prosecution.116 Nonetheless, in the face of
this acknowledged absence of information supporting any
particular error rate, the court found that good performance on
certification exams and a culture that deems any discovered
identification errors so impermissible as to be career-ending,
spoke sufficiently to the question of error rate as to render the
ACE-V approach to fingerprint identification reliable under
Daubert. To be sure, in the right circumstances, proficiency
tests could indeed provide substantial and adequate
information regarding error rates, but the current certification
tests are neither challenging enough nor taken in
circumstances sufficiently mirroring actual practice for this
inference to be warranted.117 Similarly, the fact that the
professional culture within the latent fingerprint community
may view any false identification error as career-jeopardizing if
discovered does not itself establish that errors do not occur.
Indeed, one could imagine that a professional culture that
deems certain errors career-ending might also be a culture that
chooses not to look very hard for them.
Turning to the testing factor of Daubert, the judge
explained:
The court further finds that, while the ACE-V methodology appears
to be amenable to testing, such testing has not yet been performed.
The court disagrees that testing that establishes the validity of the
principles underlying ACE-V-that fingerprints are unique and
permanent-can substitute for testing of the ACE-V methodology
itself. That testing, however, is relevant as it provides a foundation
for the ACE-V methodology. . . . But as the defendant points out,
there is not a standard defining how many similarities must be
found before a match is declared. Younce testified that there is no
minimum number of “points” in common necessary to declare a
match between a known and an unknown print. Indeed, Younce
testified that such a requirement would be unscientific. While it is
possible that this position is ultimately correct, it is not supported by
the studies submitted by the plaintiff. Evidence that no two
115

Id. at 704.
Id.
See generally Koehler, Proficiency Tests, supra note 1; Mnookin,
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1, at 136-37.
116
117
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fingerprints are the same—or that no two 21.7% of a print are the
same—is not evidence that no two fingerprints can share a partial
print in common. The court finds that this concern does not render
fingerprint evidence unreliable for the purposes of Daubert. While
the possibility that two fingers may have a fractional portion of a
print in common may affect the probability estimates that two
fingers may leave the same fractional print, that possibility goes to
the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.118

Note that here, the court determined that testing could be done
and that it had not yet been done. Furthermore, the court
understood, quite correctly, that evidence supporting the
uniqueness and permanence of fingerprints did not itself
establish that fingerprint examiners could actually make
certain identifications. The court further recognized the lack of
objective standards for determining a match. But at this point,
the court essentially punted. Without any serious effort at
analysis or explanation, the court simply decided that these
difficulties went to the weight of the evidence rather than its
admissibility.119 Still, compared to ostrich judges, this court at
least elected to name clearly some of the problems with the
research basis supporting fingerprint identification.
Another one of the many examples of judicial ACE-V
thinking is the appellate opinion in United States v. Mitchell.120
The court acknowledged that if “directed, specific actual
testing” were the requirement of Daubert, then fingerprint
evidence would have significant problems.121 However, the court
seemed to believe that “directed, specific, actual testing” was
not in fact required; instead, the long and substantial history of
the use of the technique could provide what the court
considered to be a form of “implicit testing.”122 Moreover, the
court emphasized that while it was indeed required to be a
“gatekeeper” for scientific evidence, it was also “only a
gatekeeper, and a gatekeeper alone does not protect the
castle.”123 All in all, though the evidence supporting validity
might be imperfect, the real question, in the court’s estimation,
was whether the available evidence of validity was sufficient to
pass the baton from the court to the adversary system.124 In
other words, fingerprint evidence might not be Valid (with a
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
Id.
365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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capital V) but it was valid enough, in the court’s estimation, for
cross-examination and counter-expertise to be an adequate
corrective to whatever limitations might be present.125
Another, and perhaps the best-known, example of
judicial ACE-V thinking is Judge Louis Pollak’s second opinion
in United States v. Llera Plaza (“Llera Plaza II”).126 The first
time he considered fingerprint evidence, the judge—an
especially thoughtful jurist, and a former professor and dean at
Yale Law School—made fingerprint history by ruling, in Llera
Plaza I, that latent fingerprint evidence did not pass muster
under Daubert. After a re-hearing on somewhat unusual
procedural grounds, Judge Pollak, by his own admission,
changed his mind. In his second opinion, Llera Plaza II, he
continued to find that Daubert’s testing factor was not fulfilled.
On error rates, he found that the extant proficiency tests gave
little assistance because they were too easy to provide a
125

There is an important point lurking here. The best argument for
admissibility under Daubert is that the problems with fingerprint evidence are
problems that can adequately be made clear and explicated to a lay factfinder on crossexamination. Hence the evidence need not be excluded, because, given that this isn’t
“rocket science,” as Judge Gertner put it in an important case limiting handwriting
identification evidence, juries can adequately understand the weaknesses and evaluate
accordingly. United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (1999). Whether or not this
is a fair assessment of jury capacity, it is far from clear why the adversary system’s
mechanisms should be deemed adequate for forensic science, but not in other arenas of
expert evidence. In any event, for this argument to have any merit whatsoever, judges
do clearly have to give the defense significant leeway in calling expert witnesses who
can provide these important field critiques. There have been several judges who,
having decided that the evidence is admissible under the applicable legal standard,
have then refused to allow the defendant to offer testimony challenging its
fundamental validity. This is both disturbing and disingenuous—if the best argument
for admission of pattern identification evidence is that it can be adequately
“impeached” through the adversary process, then it is imperative that the defense have
the opportunity to present the weaknesses and uncertainties of the evidence. For
examples of cases that undertake this sleight of hand, see, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 920
So. 2d 769 (2006) (excluding Simon Cole’s testimony, reasoning, “what Dr. Cole cannot
do in challenging the admissibility of the State’s fingerprint evidence, he equally
cannot do here in purportedly challenging the weight of said evidence”); United States
v. Taylor, No. CR 07-1244 WJ, 2009 WL 6338569 (D.N.M., Sept. 30, 2009) (firearms
identification case where the testimony of Adina Schwartz was excluded at trial
because “to allow Dr. Schwartz to give this testimony during a trial would not be, as
Defendant argues, to allow a healthy ‘battle of the experts.’ Instead it would be to
engage in what this Court considers the highly questionable practice of allowing a
second Daubert hearing to play out in front of the jury.”) Daubert itself says, “Vigorous
cross examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). If the best argument for admitting
this evidence notwithstanding its shakiness is that understanding the weaknesses is
not beyond the ken of the jury, it is imperative that the defense be permitted the
“traditional and appropriate means” of attacking this evidence. Id.
126
188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Penn. 2002).
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discriminating measure of competence. But he nonetheless
found that the absence of any evidence showing a substantial
error rate provided some evidence that the error rate was
tolerably low.127 His bottom line was, more or less, that
fingerprint evidence wasn’t exemplary, but it was good enough:
“[T]o postpone present in-court utilization of this ‘bedrock
forensic identifier’ pending such research would be to make the
best the enemy of the good.”128 All things considered, it’s valid
(enough).
C.

Dividing the Baby: The Solomonic Compromise

The third approach, to which I will give the most
attention because it represents the most thoughtful judicial
approach taken to date to assessing the admissibility of
forensic science evidence in court, is what I am calling the
“Solomonic compromise.” This approach reflects judges’ efforts
to split the difference between admissibility and exclusion in a
way that superficially seems to make sense, but becomes, I will
suggest, increasingly problematic upon careful reflection. This
approach permits the expert to testify about similarities and
differences in the patterns at issue, but prohibits or limits the
expert from reaching expert conclusions about the meaning of
those similarities. Llera Plaza I—the opinion Judge Pollak
vacated after a preliminary hearing—took precisely this
approach. His explanation in his original opinion is worth
quoting in detail:
Since the court finds that ACE-V does not meet Daubert’s
testing, peer review, and standards criteria, and that information as
to ACE V’s rate of error is in limbo, the expected conclusion would be
that the government should be precluded from presenting any
fingerprint testimony. But that conclusion—apparently putting at
naught a century of judicial acquiescence in fingerprint identification
processes—would be unwarrantably heavy-handed. The Daubert
difficulty with the ACE-V process is by no means total. The difficulty
comes into play at the stage at which, as experienced fingerprint
specialists Ashbaugh and Meagher themselves acknowledge, the
ACE-V process becomes “subjective”—namely, the evaluation stage.
By contrast, the antecedent analysis and comparison stages are,
according to the testimony, “objective”: analysis of the rolled and
latent prints and comparison of what the examiner has observed in
127

Id. at 566.
Id. at 572. For a thoughtful critical analysis of this opinion, see generally
David H. Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-Plaza, 21
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1073 (2003).
128
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the two prints. Up to the evaluation stage, the ACE-V fingerprint
examiner’s testimony is descriptive, not judgmental. Accordingly,
this court will permit the government to present testimony by
fingerprint examiners who, suitably qualified as “expert” examiners
by virtue of training and experience, may (1) describe how the rolled
and latent fingerprints at issue in this case were obtained, (2)
identify and place before the jury the fingerprints and such
magnifications thereof as may be required to show minute details,
and (3) point out observed similarities (and differences) between any
latent print and any rolled print the government contends are
attributable to the same person. What such expert witnesses will not
be permitted to do is to present “evaluation” testimony as to their
“opinion” (Rule 702) that a particular latent print is in fact the print
of a particular person. The defendants will be permitted to present
their own fingerprint experts to counter the government’s fingerprint
testimony, but defense experts will also be precluded from
presenting “evaluation” testimony. Government counsel and defense
counsel will, in closing arguments, be free to argue to the jury that,
on the basis of the jury’s observation of a particular latent print and
a particular rolled print, the jury may find the existence, or the nonexistence, of a match between the prints.129

There are several aspects to note regarding Llera Plaza
I’s logic. First, the court clearly and decisively recognizes that
the latent fingerprint identification evidence did not fare well
under Daubert’s strictures.130 But then, because some part of
the evidence is “descriptive, not judgmental” and in partial
deference to the long judicial acceptance of this form of proof,
the judge determined that outright exclusion would be
“unwarrantably heavy-handed.”131 His compromise was to
permit the expert to show the jury the similarities in the prints
at issue, to point their attention toward the data that the
expert would typically use to derive his or her conclusion, but
to prohibit the expert from actually providing that conclusion
or opinion to the jury. The idea is that the expert would merely
be showing “objective” data to the jury; it would then be up to
the jury, without overt expert assistance, to decide what
129

Llera Plaza (I), 179 F. Supp. 2d at 516. Note that while Judge Pollak was
the first judge to take this compromise approach to the admissibility of latent
fingerprint evidence in particular, he was following an approach taken by several other
courts in the context of expert evidence on handwriting identification evidence. The
first judge to take this approach was Judge Matsch, in the trial of Timothy McVeigh for
the Oklahoma City bombing. No written opinion was issued, but the transcript of the
discussion of this issue is available at Pre-Trial Transcr., United States v. McVeigh,
1997 WL 47724 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 1997). Judge Nancy Gertner was the first judge to
issue a written opinion in support of this approach in United States v. Hines, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999). See infra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
130
Llera Plaza (I), 179 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
131
Id.
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meaning to give to the data, and what conclusion, if any, to
reach about the likelihood that the fingerprints it had been
shown derived from a common source.
While other courts have not yet taken this approach to
fingerprint evidence (and of course Pollak himself reversed
course in Llera Plaza II), a number of other judges have
adopted this same structural compromise—description without
ultimate conclusion—in cases involving other kinds of pattern
identification evidence, notably handwriting and firearms
identification.132
At first glance, this compromise approach seems to be a
clever and appropriate strategy.133 Merely pointing out the
similarities and differences in two visible patterns without
providing any conclusion does, it seems to me, reduce or even
eliminate the Daubert problems with the evidence. To be sure,
it is not altogether clear that an expert’s testimony is even
necessary to point out similarities and differences in two visual
exemplars, as the jury members can look at the images for
themselves and thus have access to the same visual data with
or without the expert’s testimony. However, due to his or her
training and experience, an expert may well be better at seeing
those similarities and differences. Lay jurors may therefore be
meaningfully assisted in their own observations and
examinations of the visual stimuli by having the expert point
out precisely what is worth looking at, how to look, and how to
see minutiae, and both the similarities and differences in the
visual exemplars, for themselves.
The experts, in other words, may, under this approach,
provide the factfinder with a kind of educative expertise—the
expert does not ask for deference to his or her authority, but
rather, teaches the jury members how to see the patterns
present in the fingerprint or bullet or handwriting sample for

132

See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999)
(involving handwriting identification); United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.
Mass. 2005) (involving firearms identification); United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d
567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (permitting a firearms identification to be deemed “more likely
than not” but not permitting individualization in absolute terms). There are several
other handwriting identification cases that have followed Hines in taking this
approach. See generally Risinger, Cases Involving, supra note 8.
133
Indeed, several academic commentators have noted it with approval. See,
e.g., Michael J. Saks, Protecting Factfinders From Being Overly Misled, While Still
Admitting Weakly Supported Forensic Science into Evidence, 43 TULSA L. REV. 609
(2007); Robert P. Mosteller, Finding the Golden Mean with Daubert: An Elusive,
Perhaps Impossible, Goal, 52 VILL. L. REV. 723, 760-62 (2007).
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themselves.134 It is as if the expert is teaching the jury how to
read music, instead of playing the notes on the piano himself.
The expert provides a lesson in “how to see,” and the jury then
exercises its own vision and reaches its own conclusion.
Framed in this way, it is fair to say that the expert assistance
in pointing out similarities and any difference meets the
“helpfulness” requirement for expert testimony under
Daubert.135
Furthermore, the lack of knowledge about error rates,
the non-existence of objective standards for determining a
match, and the lack of statistical models for determining the
probabilities of a match do not seem nearly as problematic
under Daubert, at least at first glance, when no conclusion
about the meaning of the match is being provided. As Judge
Gertner explained in a case involving handwriting
identification,
[The expert’s] account of what is similar or not similar in the
handwriting of [the defendant] and the robber can be understood and
evaluated by the jury. . . . This is not rocket science, or higher math.
Her conclusion of authorship, however, has a difference resonance:
“Out of all of my experience, and training, I am saying that he is the
one, the very author.” That leap may not at all be justified by the
underlying data; and in the context of this case, is extraordinarily
prejudicial.136

If the expert confines herself to pointing out similarities and
differences to the factfinder, while eschewing all conclusions,
then the questions regarding the legitimate strength of the
expert’s conclusions, or the lack of a statistical model to justify
a claim about the probabilities associated with a match, or the
appropriate error rates associated with the expert’s
conclusions, all become moot. No match, and, indeed, no
ultimate conclusion regarding identification or its absence, is
being introduced into evidence.
Perhaps, then, this compromise provides an exemplary
way to navigate away from the awkward spot in which the
forensic sciences now find themselves? Certainly, the small
handful of judges that have put forward this compromise view
are to be commended, for they are wrestling valiantly with a
134

Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts:
Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131 (1993). For an extensive discussion of
education versus deference in the context of handwriting identification experts, see
generally Mnookin, Scripting Expertise, supra note 1.
135
Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 at 591.
136
Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
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set of hard questions about how to handle these powerful but
inadequately tested forms of proof. It may well be that the
Solomonic compromise is the best practical alternative we can
come up with at present if courts deem exclusion too draconian
a remedy. This compromise eliminates the excessively strong
and presently unjustified claims about the strength of forensic
experts’ conclusions. It represents an effort to acknowledge, on
the one hand, the likely power of this evidence, while, on the
other hand, not treating the evidence as if it passes Daubert
with flying colors like Havvard.
And yet, just like King Solomon’s proposal to divide the
baby between the two women claiming to be its mother, this
compromise approach is, unfortunately, fundamentally
unsatisfying. Why so? Upon careful analysis, there are two
significant difficulties that arise. First, it may be substantially
more difficult, as a practical matter, to eliminate the evaluative
aspects from testimony than one might expect. For example,
Judge Gertner wrote in Hines, “The witness can be cross
examined, as she was, about why this difference was not
considered consequential, while this difference was, and the
jury can draw their own conclusions.”137 But notice what the
witness would be testifying to here. While she would not be
testifying to an ultimate conclusion about authorship, she
would be testifying as to why some differences are considered
consequential and others are not, rather than simply
presenting the visual content of the handwriting exemplars
and pointing out similarities and/or differences. This is,
already, evaluative rather than merely descriptive.138 She would
be saying, more or less, “this kind of difference is still
consistent with the two samples coming from the same person’s
writing, while this other difference is not something we would
expect to see in two samples of writing from the same person.”
Perhaps the expert’s inferences regarding the interpretive
137

Id.
Moreover, as I pointed out some time ago, taken to the extreme, this would
result in little more than a semantic difference between this “restricted” approach and
permitting conclusion testimony under Daubert. If an expert can say to the jury, “Look
at these seventeen meaningful similarities, and here’s why they are really meaningful”
and, “Look at these three apparent differences, and here’s why I don’t think they count
for anything,” the expert’s own conclusion about authorship or identification would be
completely clear to the jury, even if the expert did not actually use the words “match”
anywhere in his or her testimony. See generally Mnookin, Scripting Expertise, supra
note 1; accord, Risinger, Cases Involving, supra note 8, at 510; D. Michael Risinger &
Jeffrey Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and “Offender
Profiling”, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 193, 209-10 (2002).
138
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meaning of this data are correct, and perhaps not. The point is
that either way, this is not merely showing the jury the
existence of similarities and differences but is, already,
evaluating their meaning, determining which differences truly
“count” in favor of a conclusion of authorship and which may
not. And thus we need again to ask a set of already familiar
questions: What data shows that the expert can do what she or
he claims to be able to do? Is there data to support the notion
that a certain kind of difference is consistent with authorship
and another kind is not? How accurate are such conclusions?
What is their error rate?
We have returned, in essence, straight back to the
Daubert problem, albeit having drilled down the analysis to a
more particularized, local, level, rather than asking validity
questions with respect to an overall conclusion about
authorship of the writing. Similarly, in the case of fingerprint
identification, consider the expert’s belief that a particular
apparent visual difference between the two prints is an artifact
rather than an actual discrepancy. If the expert is permitted to
testify that he or she believes that a particular difference is not
a true discrepancy, that too raises all the same questions about
the extent to which data supports the ability of an expert to
accurately distinguish between source discrepancies and
differences that are not interpretively meaningful, “real”
differences in the source prints versus those differences that
derive from the process of taking and making the images. At
present, adequate published data regarding the reliability and
scientific validity of these mid-level inferences is largely nonexistent.
This analysis might suggest a straightforward answer:
perhaps what is needed is simply to take a more complete endrun around Daubert by carefully prohibiting what we might
call “intermediate” inferences about the evidence. Judges could
permit experts truly to testify only to what they see, literally
just to point the factfinder toward details on the bullet, the
print, or the handwriting exemplar that the layperson might
not have noticed without expert assistance. If experts truly
limited themselves only to description,139 wouldn’t that
139

I am here ignoring the question of whether there is actually any such thing
as description without interpretation—my own view would be that there is not.
Nonetheless, these are matters of degree, and prohibiting all inferences about the
likely significance of the minutiae observed does get closer to being “just” description
than does permitting the expert’s overtly evaluative statements.
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eliminate the lurking validity problems associated with midlevel evaluations and conclusions? Leave it entirely to the jury
to decide whether particular visual differences ought or ought
not to be taken as meaningful discrepancies in two
fingerprints. Leave it to the jury to decide whether the quantity
and types of differences in two handwriting samples suggest
distinct authorship or remain consistent with one person
having some degree of inevitable variation in how they form
their letters.
If we truly limited the expert to “pure” description, this
might indeed solve the lurking Daubert issues, though it would
do so by radically curtailing the expert’s role. It should be noted
that this would also be quite an unusual approach to
expertise—part of what is special about experts’ roles under
the Federal Rules of Evidence is precisely that experts are
typically given significantly more leeway than lay witnesses to
provide their opinions and conclusions.140 Placing forensic
experts into a kind of Lockean straitjacket—permitting them
only to testify to what they can empirically observe, rather
than allowing them to share the inferences and judgments they
make about what they see—is, in a sense, to de-authorize them
as experts. Much of what a forensic expert thinks of as his or
her expertise—which is precisely the experience-based ability
to assess and analyze the image; to differentiate signal from
noise and artifact from discrepancy; and to evaluate whether
two patterns did or did not come from the same source—would
no longer be permitted. This is not necessarily a bad outcome—
indeed, it might well spur an increased interest among forensic
scientists themselves in promoting and participating in the
research that would permit the courts to grant them a more
significant evaluative role. But it is important to recognize that
if we take this compromise seriously, the permitted testimony
must be quite limited, significantly more curtailed than it was,
for example, in Hines itself.141
Moreover, we should recognize that juries will likely
still find such extremely curtailed evidence quite probative.
Juries walk in the door with prior, culturally-based views about
evidence and what kinds of evidence count, and most jurors
probably arrive with a deeply-held belief in the significant
power of pattern identification evidence, just like my seatmate
140
141

See generally FED. R. EVID. 701-02.
Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62.
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on the airplane whose beliefs about forensic science derived
mostly from her television-viewing. So even if all an expert did
was point out similarities, with absolutely no testimony
whatsoever about the meaning of these similarities, a jury
might be quite prepared to presume that those similarities
imply that the two impressions come from a common source.
This leads to the second, more serious difficulty. The
still-larger problem with the Solomonic compromise is that if
experts cannot provide some data-based, research-justified
evidence supporting their conclusions, it is not clear that the
impression evidence should be admissible at all. The problem,
in a sense, migrates: it stops being a problem relating to the
adequacy of the evidence supporting scientific validity, and
becomes a problem of relevance and probative value.
To put the point in terms of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, radically curtailing the experts’ testimony solves the
Rule 702 expert evidence problem, but at the cost of creating a
Rule 401/403 problem. Rule 401 requires that all evidence be
relevant, and the Federal Rules define as relevant that
evidence which makes “the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”142 Rule
403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence when “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury.”143
The problem, in a nutshell, is that if the expert cannot
provide the factfinder with any admissible evidence about the
meaning of the visual similarities and differences, then the
factfinder has no rational basis for assessing the probative
value of these observations. Certainly the factfinder can look at
the visual stimuli herself, but what legitimate basis does she
have for making an inference about probative value given
whatever quantum of similarities she observes? The key
question about the meaning of any pattern identification
evidence is how much support it provides for the inference that
two patterns do or do not share a common source. How often
would we expect to see any given degree of similarity from two
bullets that did not come from the same gun, or from two

142
143

FED. R. EVID. 401.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
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fingerprints that were not actually impressions from the same
finger?
To answer this question, juries could draw on two
potential sources of knowledge: information provided by the
evidence presented to them at trial via an expert, or their own
experience. But in the Solomonic compromise, we are
prohibiting the first kind of information, because it does not at
present meet Daubert’s strictures. So juries are left entirely to
their own resources and devices—only their own experience
can help them assess the probative value of the patterns at
issue. But a serious problem arises because—with the possible
exception of handwriting identification—juries simply do not
have any meaningful experience on which to draw for these
conclusions. Non-experts are not in the habit of looking closely
at ridge minutiae on fingerprints to develop intuitions about
how much similarity might exist on the tips of two different
individuals’ fingers. Ordinary people do not encounter bullet
striations in their regular life. Jurors therefore have literally
no personal, experience-based information that would provide
any rational basis for evaluating the similarities and
differences that the expert helped them to notice. While the
evidence might nonetheless squeak by Rule 401, given the very
low threshold for defining relevance under the Rules of
Evidence, the lack of any rational basis for assessing its
meaning makes the evidence both prejudicial and potentially
misleading, thus rendering it excludable under Rule 403.144 One
can think of the issue like this: because we believe forensic
expert testimony often has probative value, it is therefore
relevant—but because we really do not have any rational way
to assess that probative value, its admissibility seriously risks
being both misleading and prejudicial.
To be sure, we regularly permit jurors to engage in lay
assessments of “frequencies” and to determine for themselves
probative value in the trial process. If a victim who saw the
perpetrator testifies that the person who assaulted her had
grey hair, a beard, and a tattoo of a purple parrot on his
forearm, and the defendant also has those characteristics, we
144

Certainly it is a reasonable inference to say that two prints or two bullets
that have many similarities to one another are more likely to come from a common
source than two that do not. For this reason, the evidence does, I suppose, meet
Federal Rule of Evidence 401’s low standard, which deems relevant that evidence
which has “any tendency” to make a matter more or less probative standard. The
problem that we know it has some tendency, but cannot presently quantify how much
or how little power it really has.
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do not require any data to be presented to the jury on the
frequency with which any or all of these characteristics
actually exist within the relevant suspect population. Nor do
we require any formalized model for assessing the likelihood
that these traits would co-exist within a given individual
within that population, or whether the different characteristics
tend to be statistically independent from one another or not. 145
We let the jury decide for itself precisely how much power and
how much probative value to give to the evidence introduced
that shows that the perpetrator and the defendants share
certain characteristics in common. The fact that individual
juror’s subjective assessments of the frequency of purple parrot
tattoos might be wildly off-base does not render the evidence
inadmissible.
Why, then, is the evidence of the similarities in bullet
striations or ridge detail on fingerprints any different from the
evidence of the purple parrot tattoo? Yes, juror assessments of
the evidentiary power of the pattern similarities in a
fingerprint might be substantially inaccurate, but that risk
exists in the tattoo scenario as well. The difference, I would
suggest, is that we believe that jurors’ ordinary lives provide
them with some legitimate basis—albeit partial and
imperfect—for assessing the frequency of purple parrot tattoos
on people’s forearms. In ordinary life, people see each other’s
forearms—and each other’s tattoos—with some regularity.
Most of us probably do not go around counting how many
people have tattoos, or keeping track of how many birds we
have ever seen tattooed on other people’s bodies. But
nonetheless, our individual paths navigating through the
crowded world do give us an experiential basis for having a
rough empirical sense of just how rare or common purple
parrot tattoos might be.146 Note, in a sense, that our individual
145

Indeed, in the famous case of People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968), a
case that came to stand for the reluctance of courts to frame questions in overtly
probabilistic terms, the effort to use the “product” rule to figure out a combined
probability of a variety of specific characteristics—ranging from the fact that the couple
was interracial to the fact that she had blonde hair and a ponytail and he had a
beard—was strongly criticized. For the classic critique of excessive confidence in
probabilistic thinking in court, see generally Lawrence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971). However, one
of the (numerous) problems in Collins was that the numbers presented to the jurors
were purely speculative—they were simply the expert’s illustration of possible numbers
to illustrate how the product rule worked, rather than numbers based on empirical
reality. Collins, 438 P.2d 33.
146
There is a stronger argument for taking the “compromise” approach in
handwriting identification cases, precisely because our ordinary lives do give us some
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relationships to the evaluation of parrot tattoos are rather like
the forensic expert’s relationship to the evaluation of
patterns—they are experience-based, non-quantitative, and
without any known error rate. The difference however, is in
role: we expect juries to bring their common knowledge to their
role as factfinder and to their assessment of the evidence, and
we do not require this common knowledge to be validated or
scientific. The same cannot be said for the expert required to
meet the strictures of Daubert.
In addition, the strong cultural belief in forensic science
evidence, based first and foremost on its roughly one hundred
years of courtroom use, likely means that even without any
actual experience of their own looking at comparable patterns,
jurors will believe they do know the meaning of the similarities
they are taught by the expert to observe. With latent
fingerprint
examination,
the
tradition
of
experts
individualizing in court—without adequate data or research to
support their claim—may well mean that when a jury is
presented with latent fingerprint identification evidence
without any expert conclusions, it will nonetheless believe itself
quite capable of drawing a conclusion of identity. But this
confidence and belief does not derive from the first-hand
experience of jury members looking with care at fingerprints or
bullet striations. Rather, it would stem from their prior belief
that latent fingerprints can individualize, and hence if these
prints appear reasonably similar, then they probably did come
from the same person. They may not ever have looked at
fingerprints for themselves, but from courtroom dramas on
television, from criminal cases they have read about in the
newspaper, from CSI, from their myriad cultural experiences in
the world, they may well believe not only that everyone’s
fingerprints are different, but also that two similar prints must
necessarily have come from the same finger.147

meaningful experience looking at people’s handwriting. Non-experts do have some
experience looking at writing, attempting to gauge authorship, and have an experiencebased sense of what degree of similarity of writing one might expect to see in the
writing of the same author versus two different authors. To be sure, experts may be
better than non-experts at assessing the meaning of these similarities and
differences—but the point here is not who is better at this, or by what degree, but
rather, whether non-experts have a lay basis for evaluation sufficient to justify
admissibility of the similarities if there is no admissible evidence about their meaning.
To put it differently, handwriting is a lot more like the purple parrot tattoo.
147
The cultural mythology of fingerprints remains deep and widespread; even
my seven-year-old son told me the other day that everyone’s fingerprints are different.
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Notice the concerning kind of feedback loop occurring
here. The substance of the excluded evidence—conclusions
about the common source of the latent print and the
exemplar—is likely to be presumed by the jury precisely
because that now-excluded evidence has generally been
admitted in the past. If my hunch about likely jury
expectations and prior understanding is correct, then the
common knowledge that will be doing a good deal of
interpretive work for the jury when they try to assess the
fingerprint is the very evidence that was excluded. That
certainly raises a significant Rule 403 problem.
Therefore, unless the expert can provide the jury with
some valuable, data-driven basis for interpreting the meaning
of the similarities and differences that are presented, the
pattern identification evidence presented under the Solomonic
compromise still ought to raise significant admissibility
concerns. This is not because the experts’ descriptions are
insufficiently reliable under Rule 702, but because of the lack
of any basis—apart from the jury’s likely prior belief in the
very conclusions that have been excluded—for meaningfully
evaluating the probative value of the evidence.
The Solomonic compromise is thus far more problematic
than it initially appears. However, I recognize that it might
nonetheless be a reasonable second-best solution given the
present impasse, and I therefore do believe it has a legitimate
place in the judicial “toolkit” for assessing pattern
identification evidence. Moreover, there might be ways, at trial,
to dislodge, at least partially, whatever prior beliefs the jurors
had about the basis for individualization or the meaning of a
“match.” If the Solomonic compromise were coupled with
effective evidence to demonstrate that there is not a statistical
basis for reaching a conclusion about whether the two patterns
come from a common source, nor any validated metrics for
evaluating how much similarity is needed to warrant such a
conclusion, the jury might call into question its prior
assumption that similarity necessarily meant identity.
There is little doubt that evidence of similarity of bullet
striation patterns or handwriting similarities or friction-ridge
patterns on fingerprints often does have probative value. The
question is how much. The hard question facing judges is what
to do given that the answer to that “how much” question is, “we
really don’t quite know.” It seems clear that on the basis of
current empirical knowledge, judges should absolutely not
permit conclusions of individualization to be made by experts,
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and softening an individualization conclusion by framing it as
“opinion” rather than “fact” does not enhance either its validity
or its research basis. Nor should either judges or experts kid
themselves that adding in some fudge words like “to a
reasonable certainty” changes the analysis at all.148
The harder question is whether the fact that we don’t
know precisely how much probative value to assign to evidence
of any given quantum of similarity—and that a jury assessing
the meaning of these similarities likely has no first-hand life
experience to help assess probative value—ought to lead to the
evidence’s exclusion. As a matter of logic, without some
meaningful basis for assessing the probative value, the
evidence becomes literally uninterpretable—and this should
rationally argue in favor of exclusion. But given that experts’
experience and our collective cultural experience over the last
century with fingerprint identification evidence supports the
inference that the probative value of this evidence is likely to
be
quite
substantial,
the
Solomonic
compromise,
notwithstanding its awkwardness, might be as good an option
as any for the moment. The Solomonic compromise, is in a
sense, an approach based on a bet that the cultural belief in
forensic science will, when more research has been conducted,
largely prove to have been warranted. The more confident a
judge is that future research will be likely to validate the
claims fingerprint examiners have been making in court for the
last 100 years, the less troubled she might be by letting those
conclusions in through the back door, via jurors’ prior beliefs
about forensic science and its credibility. Put like that, the
Solomonic compromise becomes a more nuanced version of
judicial ACE-V—all things considered, it’s valid enough to
permit, so long as we force it into an uncomfortable
straitjacket, a straitjacket that cannot be expected to stay on
within the jury room.
Thus, even though it does have an appropriate role in
the judicial toolkit, the Solomonic compromise is, at best, an
awkward doctrinal solution. If only we had the data to support
them, it would be far better to permit expert inferences about
the meaning of similarities and conclusions about probative
value. It is also worth noting that outright exclusion would put
significantly more pressure on the forensic science community
to cooperate with and to lobby for the research that would
148

Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
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bring them back into the evidentiary fold. Nonetheless, I can
certainly understand the attraction of the Solomonic
compromise as a second-best solution for probative but underresearched evidence that has a long history of legal acceptance.
IV.

IN DEFENSE OF EXCLUSION (FOR NOW)

The other viable alternative is, obviously, outright
exclusion, at least in some circumstances.149 Given judges’
treatment of forensic science evidence so far, arguing for
exclusion of this evidence can feel, from a practical standpoint,
more than a little quixotic.
And yet, the truth of the matter is that at present,
pattern identification evidence does not have the empirical
data to back up the claims made in court. Moreover, just as
with DNA evidence—which after an initial honeymoon period,
was excluded by a number of jurisdictions for a short period of
time because of concerns about the subjectivity of standards for
determining a match; insufficient research into the underlying
questions of population genetics; and general technical
sloppiness150—exclusion would be a great motivator for
pursuing the research necessary to justify admissibility.
Moreover, I want to suggest that the use of the
exclusion option —which I do think should have a central place
in the judicial toolkit, given the present lack of an adequate
research basis supporting validity—could also be quite shortterm in most pattern identification arenas. For as I will
suggest, what ought to be the minimum necessary information
to establish adequate validity under Daubert is simply not that
onerous. Good proficiency tests, which show the extent to which
examiners make errors in a variety of different levels of
difficulty, should suffice to support a finding of adequate
149

I do not explicitly address the question of when courts should exclude, and
when the Solomonic approach is warranted. Partly that is because I think, in many
instances, either approach could be a legitimate exercise of judicial discretion given the
current state of our knowledge. Moreover, the choice ought to be informed by the
particulars—were I a judge ruling on admissibility, I would be far more likely to
exclude a single AFIS-generated match than evidence that linked multiple, highquality prints to several different fingers of the same individual. Even without formal
metrics for sufficiency, common sense—and Kumho Tire—tell us that all identification
tasks are not created equal, and the judicial response can, and sometimes should, vary
as a result.
150
See generally JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW AND
CONTROVERSY IN THE MAKING OF DNA PROFILING (2007); DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE
HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2009); Jennifer L. Mnookin, People v. Castro, in
EVIDENCE STORIES (Richard Lempert, ed. 2006).
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validity, presuming that the error rates discovered through this
testing process are tolerably low, and the match between what
was tested and the “task at hand” in the particular case is
sufficiently close.
More generally, as I have also argued elsewhere, I want
to suggest that under Daubert it is the ‘testing’ criteria that
should matter most.151 I want to make a distinction between
explanation or description, on the one hand, and testing on the
other. Explanation of the methods and descriptions of the
processes used by an expert should not be permitted to
substitute for adequate testing of validity. It is this mistake, I
believe, that has often plagued the courts when evaluating
forensic science. Judges hear about the ACE-V process and
they listen to examiners describing their approach, and judges
are persuaded, it seems, that this methodology therefore
works.152 They, like the factfinders, see the similarities
magnified and put up on a giant chart, and they “see” the
method in action, and believe its power. Even putting aside
that ACE-V is not, in fact, much of a specified methodology, the
more important point is that the courts should care less about
the details of the method at issue or its seeming plausibility,
and more about what evidence there is to support the
conclusion that the methods actually work.
In other words, judges have been lulled by plausible
descriptions and seemingly persuasive explanations of forensic
science techniques into dismissing the importance of the nearly
complete lack of empirical support for the experts’ claims. All of
the opinions discussed above as examples of legal “ACE-V”
have this quality. These judges recognized the lack of testing,
but found enough within the description of the method that
seemed credible that they decided that the technique passed
muster.153 This, in my view, is a mistake.
To be sure, the pattern identification techniques of
forensic science do have a certain intuitive plausibility to them,
and their early acceptance was linked, in no small part, to this
cultural plausibility.154 We all have some experience identifying
handwriting for example: no doubt most of us believe that we
151

See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, Of Black Boxes, Instruments, and
Experts: Testing the Validity of Forensic Science, 5 EPISTEME 343 (2008) [hereinafter
Mnookin, Of Black Boxes].
152
See supra Part III.B.
153
See generally supra notes 105-113 and accompanying text.
154
See generally Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence, supra note 1; Mnookin,
Scripting Expertise, supra note 1.
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could likely distinguish our mother’s handwriting from that of
our closest friend. We can stare down at our fingerprints as
well, and can even see for ourselves how the ridges and whorls
on our fingers vary from those of others. Moreover, these
patterns have a particular quality—they are semi-legible in
that they can be seen and their differences can be noted by all
of us, not just by experts, while at the same time, they still do
require significant expert analysis and interpretation.
But the inherent plausibility and the semi-legible
quality of these materials combine to make it particularly easy
for judges to be seduced by description and explanation into
failing to ask what they ought to be asking both as a matter of
doctrine and as a matter of logic. Their focus should be on the
degree of empirical support for the actual, specific claims being
made. They should be asking precisely what evidence supports
this particular evidentiary claim. With latent fingerprint
evidence, for example, the most central question ought to be:
how accurate are examiners when matching latent prints to a
particular source; latent prints which are often partial,
frequently smudged, and perhaps even distorted? For any of
the forensic sciences, what judges ought to ask under Daubert
is precisely this: what empirical support shows that the expert
can actually do what she claims to do? What data, what
testing, would be necessary to justify the claims being made in
the expert’s testimony?
An important corollary of this focus on testing is that it
ought to be permissible under Daubert for the technique or
method to be a kind of “black box.”155 A “black box” is a
technique or method that we do not necessarily understand,
but that we can nonetheless test to see what it does and how it
works. If there is sufficient testing to show us that it works, I
do not believe that the proffering party should be required
under Daubert to show how it works. My argument is that it is
far less important to pry open this black box than it is to ask
whether the technique has been tested under conditions
similar to those at issue in court. Peering inside the black box
to see how it works is less critical for an assessment of validity
than assessing whether input/output testing shows that it
works.156 Indeed, peering inside, on its own, ought to be deemed
neither necessary, nor sufficient under Daubert.
155

Mnookin, Of Black Boxes, supra note 151.
Id. On black box testing, see Risinger, A Glass Nine-Tenths Full, supra
note 72, at 31 n.66 and Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts, supra
156
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To make the point more concretely, when it comes to
fingerprint evidence, for example, what we really need in order
to justify admissibility is, at a minimum, some very good
proficiency tests to show us what experts can do and to gain
information about how often they make mistakes. These
proficiency tests ought to be appropriately difficult and should
mirror the range of difficulty found in actual casework. In
addition, and critically, they should include some of what
fingerprint experts would call “tough idents”—prints that are
particularly difficult to identify.157 These proficiency tests
should ideally be part of the normal stream of casework, so the
examiner doesn’t know she is being tested and therefore
possibly perform her analysis with a greater degree of care
than usual. 158
Recall that one of the research lacunae with respect to
fingerprint evidence is that we do not yet have an operational
statistical model of fingerprints, a model that could provide us
with empirically grounded information about the likelihood
that two prints selected at random would both have a specified
set of minutiae. Recall also that ACE-V is extremely vague, and
does not come close to providing a fully developed and
adequately articulated method with detailed specifications.159
Recall, in addition, that interpretation of fingerprints is
subjective, without shared norms or rules about what is
required. My argument is that these gaps in our knowledge
base, though unfortunate, are not fatal. More precisely, I want
to suggest that neither a detailed specification of method, nor
statistical validation of frequencies ought to be seen as
necessary criteria for using fingerprints as evidence in court
under Daubert’s strictures.
In other words, it ought to be acceptable for latent print
examiners themselves to operate as a kind of black box—for the

note 1, at 40-43. To be sure, I am largely skating around hard questions about whether
testing can ever be wholly “black box,” or what some degree of internal understanding
of the method is necessary in order to design good black box tests, and if so, how much.
Still, the key point is to urge courts to focus not on asking experts to explain what they
do, but rather to show that what they do works.
157
There is not presently any validated metric of difficulty for fingerprint
comparisons. Nonetheless, examiners do have at least informal understandings of what
makes particular comparisons more or less difficult.
158
There is presently a “black box” study of more or less this sort underway,
being conducted by Austin Hickland through the FBI. It sounds, from the descriptions,
like an extremely promising project. However, at this point neither the research
protocol nor the results have been made public.
159
Haber & Haber, supra note 1.
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examiners themselves to be the instrument, the technique. If
we know through proficiency tests that they get the right
answers a very high proportion of the time over a range of
circumstances that mimic what they encounter in actual cases,
their testimony ought to be admissible under Daubert. Even if
we do not fully know how their method operates—indeed, even
if they do not fully understand it themselves—this ought not to
prevent us from making evidentiary use of their conclusions if
we have sufficient information about how accurate they are
and what circumstances and conditions seem to increase the
risk of error.
Let me make one thing clear. I am certainly not opposed
to research and inquiry that peers inside the black box to learn
more about how the methodology works and aims to improve it.
There are some impressive efforts underway to model
fingerprint evidence statistically, and this is extremely
important research that I fully support.160 Of course, fingerprint
experts should continue to hone their methods, continue to
work for better understanding of how they could improve their
processes, and if researchers can help practicing forensic
scientists to develop validated standards for interpretation to
increase objectivity, that will be all to the good. All of these
efforts at better understanding, formalizing methods, and
improving practices—forms of opening up the black box and
peering inside—ought to be welcomed, celebrated, and
encouraged, and perhaps most importantly, funded.
They just ought not to be necessary requirements for
admissibility in court. Nor, standing alone, should they be
sufficient, unless they are also accompanied by evidence that
these methods, in actual practice rather than in theory, truly
work. To make the argument by analogy: Which would make a
driver more comfortable—knowing that there was substantial
theoretical knowledge suggesting that the brakes on her
vehicle ought to work, because of a great deal of scientific study
of the theoretical mechanisms underlying the brakes—or a
substantial quantity of actual testing of identical vehicles
showing that the brakes have worked consistently in conditions
that mirror her situation? While both forms of knowledge are
valuable, I would posit that the actual, on-the-ground testing,
quite appropriately gives us a good deal more comfort than the
theoretical knowledge standing alone.
160

Neumann et al, supra note 31.
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I am arguing therefore, that the courts’ central focus,
especially for a kind of evidence that does not presently have a
formalized method, should be on testing. Courts should also
insist upon a close relationship between the testing that has
been done and the claims that an expert makes. This is what
Daubert calls the question of “fit” and it is also part of what
Kumho Tire emphasizes as the need to focus on “the task at
hand.”161 Strong claims should require strong tests to back them
up. For example, fingerprint examiners claim to be able to
individualize—to match a print to one unique source, to one
finger on one person out of everyone on earth who has ever
lived or who will ever live.162 There is, as I have already stated,
not yet sufficient validation to support that claim. Nor do I
think that proficiency tests of the sort that I am describing and
suggesting as a prerequisite to admissibility would be sufficient
to support this claimed ability to individualize. Even with
excellent proficiency tests, experts would therefore need to
modulate and moderate the strength of their conclusions to
some degree. But excellent performance on difficult proficiency
tests might be sufficient to support a conclusion of a softer sort,
a conclusion such as, “Based on my knowledge, testing and
experience, I would not expect to see this degree of similarity
between two prints unless they came from a common source.”
This is still, in a way, fudging—for without a working
statistical model, we cannot have a robust and quantified sense
of the likelihood two prints with a given degree of similarity
might have come from different sources. But if we knew that
examiners in general—and that examiner in particular—had
succeeded in proficiency tests that required her to make
difficult identifications and equally difficult exclusions, we
could legitimately believe that her knowledge and experience
did adequately support her opinion that they came from a
common source.
A signal advantage of focusing on testing rather than
explanation is that it has the virtue of being manageable, from
a practical point of view. There are simply no insurmountable
obstacles to developing appropriately difficult proficiency tests.
The roadblocks to doing it thus far have been cultural and
institutional, not scientific. By contrast, developing a valid
statistical model of fingerprint evidence is a daunting task.
161
162

Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 at 591.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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Even with significant research, it likely is years away, perhaps
even decades. By contrast, proficiency test development could
be done quite rapidly. And I have little doubt that if courts
began to exclude fingerprint evidence for the lack of such tests,
the requisite testing mechanisms would be developed in
extremely short order.
Implicit in my argument here for a focus on testing is a
quasi-“best evidence” approach to the evaluation of expert
testimony.163 I do not believe that Daubert should be understood
as requiring a fixed and unchanging amount of evidence in any
particular area. Rather, the question ought to be whether the
proffered expert evidence is as reliable as it can reasonably be,
considering the context and circumstances. Validity under
Daubert should not be understood as an on/off switch, or as an
all-or-nothing proposition, in which items of evidence are
inherently reliable or unreliable. The question for the court is
whether they are reliable enough—and this depends both on
what inferences are sought to be drawn from them, and partly
on whether the evidence offered was as reliable as possible
under the circumstances. To put it differently, to pass muster
under Daubert, the judge must have some legitimate
justification for believing that the evidence is sufficiently
reliable that a jury should hear it. And the evidence of validity
should be as strong as it reasonably can be, given the
circumstances. It is, therefore, partly because proficiency tests
are genuinely ‘do-able’ that courts ought to require them.
Concomitantly, courts should hesitate before finding that
studies or research that are beyond current scientific capacity
are nonetheless required under Daubert.
In other words, if an expert—or an entire field—has
done as much as can reasonably be done to establish validity,
and our still-imperfect information suggests significant
probative value, excluding the evidence because our validity
knowledge is incomplete is not likely to be justice-enhancing—
especially if our knowledge includes reasonable estimates of
error rate, so that the factfinder can, at least in theory, adjust
its assessment of probative value accordingly. But by the same
token, if an expert—or a field—fails to undertake those tasks
which could reasonably be done to establish validity, and
163

See generally Mnookin, Of Black Boxes, supra note 151; see also Edward
Cheng, Mitochondrial DNA: Emerging Legal Issues, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 99 (2005); Dale
Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191 (2003);
Dale Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227 (1988).
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instead simply tells the court, “Trust me!” the court should balk
at the lack of data. Under this approach, evidentiary
assessment will necessarily be dynamic. A reasonable amount
of research at Time A may not continue to be adequate at Time
B, as time passes, and the potential for developing relevant
data on the salient questions increases.
It is worth noting that what drives me to a ‘better
evidence’ principle is very much the same kinds of concerns
that have motivated Margaret Berger in her important work on
causation in tort law. Professor Berger has been acutely
concerned about the difficulties plaintiffs have faced in
establishing causation in toxic torts cases.164 Throughout her
career, she has been sensitive to the significant difficulties that
scientific uncertainty poses for our legal system. In the torts
context, she has, therefore, searched for ways to protect
plaintiffs’ interests while simultaneously respecting the need
for high-quality scientific information within our system of
adjudication. Professor Berger has offered some insightful and
creative solutions to the tension between the need for good
scientific information, and the need to recognize that Daubert
(at least as interpreted by courts in the pharmaceutical torts
context) often expects too much. She has therefore searched for
principled ways around general causation, sometimes through
the possibility of expanding other kinds of tort claims—like the
right to informed choice in making a decision about medication,
or the duty of a company to keep itself informed of risks
through the pursuit of reasonable research.165
By contrast, in the forensic science challenges, courts
have interpreted Daubert as to expect rather too little, instead
of too much. But the underlying concerns—how do we deal with
uncertain knowledge, and how can we generate the right
incentives within the legal system both to do justice and to
produce better information—are strikingly similar. A ‘better
evidence’ principle may be our best bet—certainly in the
forensic science context, but perhaps more generally across the
board as well, though its potential application in other expert
contexts goes entirely beyond the scope of this article.
164

See, e.g., Margaret Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards
a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997); Margaret
Berger, Upsetting The Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme
Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 289 (2001).
165
See, e.g., Margaret Berger & Aaron Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed
Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257 (2006).
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Neither a focus on testing nor a more general ‘best
evidence’ approach to expert evidence is a panacea. There will
still be difficult questions for courts, especially regarding just
how much testing is required to justify admissibility. I do not
pretend that answering those questions will be easy or
straightforward. But they are, I think the right questions for
courts to ask. They are no doubt challenging questions for
many judges, most of whom typically lack much background in
science, and who perhaps went to law school in part precisely
to stay far away from such technical matters. Judges typically
therefore will lack epistemic competence—the ability to
evaluate the knowledge being offered the way an insider to the
field would evaluate it.166
Nonetheless, I believe that by focusing on testing, courts
are less likely to be misled, less likely to be lulled by
compelling-sounding but as-of-yet unproven explanations, and
less likely to gloss over remarkable gaps in what is known.
Testing is a narrower, more tightly bounded inquiry. It
explicitly directs judges to the question of what data is
available to support the expert’s conclusions, and to focus on
the specific fit between the data and the claim. Might judges
misunderstand a study, fail to notice methodological flaws, or
misconstrue what inferences can legitimately be drawn from a
given research result? Absolutely. But at least these errors of
interpretation would be the result of a focus on the data itself—
which suggests, first and foremost, that there actually is some
data on the relevant questions. Given our present state of
affairs, this in itself would be a major improvement.
In addition, recall that I said at the outset of this article
that we needed a two pronged solution to our problems of
forensic science—both stricter scrutiny by the courts and
greater federal support for research and regulatory oversight.
Part of why we absolutely need the two-pronged solution is as a
check on these concerns about the epistemic competence of the
courts. If there is a research establishment funding work on
forensic science—including the funding needed both to develop
proficiency tests, and to evaluate them—it is highly likely that
academic researchers will increasingly be attracted to the
study of forensic science. Research follows money like bees
166

See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship and Epistemic
Confidence, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009 (2008); see also Scott Brewer, Expert Testimony
and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L. REV. 1535 (1998); Michael Pardo, The Field
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follow pollen. Fund it and they will come. And the structures of
academic science and social science—with peer review,
academic evaluation, as well as the review and evaluation that
could be offered by a new federal agency if one ever were to be
developed—could all offer a useful check on the quality of the
proficiency tests that need to be developed.
There is one final advantage that would result from
judges taking Daubert seriously in the context of pattern
identification, and, therefore, either dramatically restricting or
excluding evidence. At present, virtually no one believes that a
new federal agency—NIFS, as suggested in the NAS report is
likely. Whether the federal government will even create a new
institutional space somewhere within existing federal agencies,
dedicated to important issues of forensic science, is far from
certain. There is a serious risk that at the agency level, nothing
of genuine or transformative import will result from the NAS
report.
However, if judges were to begin to take seriously the
implicit lessons of the report, the odds would change
dramatically. Why so? Because it would mean that a number of
important forensic sciences would be likely to find
themselves—only temporarily, I would expect—excluded from
the courtroom due to a lack of adequate testing of the validity
of their results and methods.
And if that were to begin to happen, what would ensue?
My strong instinct is that the degree of interest in NIFS or at
least a more modest surrogate for NIFS within an existing
agency, would skyrocket. Obviously, the reason for judges to
apply Daubert meaningfully and therefore likely exclude at
least some forensic science evidence cannot primarily be to
incentivize the creation of a federal agency. Judges’ appropriate
focus is on the particular cases before them, and explicit
reference to the external incentive effects their decisions might
generate is not a first priority; even thinking in such terms
may make some judges uneasy. But in this instance, there is a
happy convergence: to wit, if the courts begin to do their job
well, it is likely to help bring about precisely the broader public
policy initiatives that are also necessary in this area.
CONCLUSION
What will the future hold for forensic science? If we look
back on these methods and techniques twenty years from now,
what will we see? It is perhaps entirely safe to predict that no
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matter what happens, the practices of forensic science still
won’t look like the television version, so my airplane seatmate
is destined for ongoing disappointment with the real world. But
I do not think it is utterly unrealistic to hope that the pattern
identification sciences will be on a much more substantial and
solid empirical footing than they are today. Ironically, they
may well look somewhat less strong than they do at present.
Testifying experts will certainly no longer be able to espouse an
error rate of zero, and they will likely need to give up the claim
that they are able to individualize. But by acknowledging their
weaknesses, and honestly assessing their capacities and
limitations, they will truly be far stronger than they are at
present, and far more worthy of credence and respect. Will
forensic science transform itself as it should? That will depend,
I believe, in significant part on judges, and whether they are
prepared, at long last, to evaluate pattern identification
evidence with their eyes wide open and their heads out of the
sand.
For all of our sake, I hope they are up to the challenge.

